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Article 2

ANTICIPATION OF INCOME
PAUL

A. TESCHNERt

An anticipatory assignment of income is an .ssignment of the assignor's right to receive amounts in the future which, absent the assignment, would constitute income to the assignor when received or otherwise
accrued to him in due course of events.' Properly extended and applied,
it is a generic principle, one which can liberate our federal income tax
system from pedestrian notions of "title" and "sale," of "earner,"
"earned" and "source," all of which have served only to twist pursuit of
particular tax consequences into the dark-obscure runways of tax irrelevancies. The Commissioner himself must bear a goodly portion of blame
for judicial enchantment with such disruptive trivia. We need no legislation to bar the close against those who would transmute what would be
ordinary income in due course of events into capital gain by a "sale" of
a "capital asset"; nor need we a statute to tax as "income" the spread
between a decedent's adjusted basis in assets owned by him at the time of
his death and a higher market value of such assets when he dies. Both
seller and decedent are necessarily divested of rights to receive amounts in
the future which, absent the divestment, would constitute income when
received or otherwise accrued in due course of events. In one case and the
other, we speak of anticipatory assignments of income.
"Full many a flow'r is born to blush unseen, And waste its sweetness on the desert air,"2 wrote Thomas Gray, and though the context be
t Partner, Pope, Ballard, Uriell, Kennedy, Shepard & Fowle, Chicago, Illinois.
1. A secondary purpose of this article is to suggest that the definition should be
neutral taxwise; hitherto courts have invariably (1) determined that income taxes
should or should not continue to be imposed upon a given t-xpayer who had assigned
away his right to receive income in the future and then (2) vcrbalized the result already
reached by concluding that a given assignment in anticipation of income was (if the
assignor continued to be taxable) or was not (if the assignor was not taxable upon
future income) an "anticipatory assignment of income."
If words are to retain any meaning at all in federal income tax cases, the inquiry
should be: "This case concerns the question whether a taxpa3 er who once made an anticipatory assignment of income should be taxed upon the future income he assigned
away"; rather than the conclusion being: "Since we have determined that the taxpayer
is not taxable upon income he once assigned away to others, he did not execute an anticipatory assignment of income when he assigned away his right to receive it."
2. Gmw,
ELEGY WRITTEN IN A COUNTRY CHURCHIYAI
(1750).
Lawyers have
much to learn from poets. While we seek a general principle here, and properly so, we
must first find its parts. A grain of sand must be a grain o sand before it may be a
part of something else, and its identity is in its being a graii of sand, not in being a
mote of the universe. The poet would express it better:
Speaking of contraries, see how the brook
In that wide wave runs counter to itself.
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a bit less sublime this has been the fate of the anticipatory assignment
principle thus far. It has largely "blushed unseen" in those remote byways of gifts of future income-and even there it has suffered from
assumed differences in kind between earned and unearned income' and
in degree between an assignor's concomitant retention or disposition of
the "source" of the income which is assigned.
Before unfencing the assignment principle so as to allow it to course
the remotest ranges of federal income tax law, let us consider the metaphoric origin of its present timidities, the three distinct areas in which
it should operate, and the critical invalidity of the premise that the
"source" of income is of any proper concern in the first place. We should
emerge with the most significant tax principle of all: the principle of
tax equality.
I.
From the beginning, rationality has not been a touchstone for decision of questions concerning the tax consequences of anticipatory assignments of income. Time out of mind, courts have preferred to ground
decisions upon the lightning rod of a metaphor once thundered from
Olympus by Mr. Justice Holmes: "The fruit may not be attributed to a
tree different from that on which it grew."4 The "fruit" is of course
taken to be income while the source of the income is represented by the
"tree." In its direct application, the metaphor proclaims that a tax upon
income is properly to be assessed against the one who owns the source
which produced the income. Its negative implication is presumed to be
It is from that in water we were from
Long, long before we were from any creature.

Here we, in our impatience of the steps, get back to the beginning of beginnings,
The stream of everything that runs away.

-ROBERT FROST, WEST-RUNNING BROOK (1928).
3. The distinction is between income from personal services and income from
"property." Pennsylvania Co. v. Philadelphia, 31 A.2d 137, 141 (Pa. 1943) ("[Earned
income] implies that some labor, management or supervision must be involved in the
production of that income. Income derived merely from the ownership of property
would not satisfy the definition.")
Until 1943, an Earned Income Credit was allowed in computing liability for federal
income taxes; the credit was irrational from the beginning. 5 MERTENs LAW OF FEDERAL
INcOME TAXATION § 32.07-32.09.
The only current statutory provision is § 911 of the 1954 CODE which has occasion to
define the concept for purposes of allowing an exclusion from gross income for "earned
income from sources without the United States":
(b) . . . [Tihe term 'earned income' means wages, salaries, or professional
fees, and other amounts received as compensation for personal services actually
rendered, but does not include that part of the compensation derived by the taxpayer for personal services rendered by him to a corporation which represents
a distribution of earnings or profits rather than a reasonable allowance as
compensation for the personal services actually rendered ..
4. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
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of equal validity: one should not be taxed upon income if he has divested
himself of ownership of the source of the income.
If either branch of the tree-fruit metaphor were valid as a statement
of necessary tax consequences, then we could perhaps live with it as but
announcing the concept that continued ownership of capital from which
income is derived is usually the tax equivalent of ownership of the income itself. The metaphor would then be almost half true, rather good
in the spectrum of tax conceptualism.
The metaphor is not even half true. A taxpayer who transfers
ownership of a source of income does not necessarily free himself from
income tax liability upon subsequently maturing income therefrom ;' and
the mere fact that one owns a source of income is not a sufficient reason
for subjecting him to income tax liability upon income derived from that
0
source.
5.

Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945)

(holding that a cor-

poration was taxable as the "Seller" of its assets where it transferred those assets to its
shareholders in the form of a "liquidating dividend" under such circumstances that the
transfer was subject to an understanding that the corporate assets would subsequently
be purchased by purchasers who had previously negotiated with the corporation) ; United
States v. Joliet and Chicago R.R., 315 U.S. 44 (1942) (holding that even thought
the taxpayer corporation leased all of its assets in perpetuity, the earnings of those
assets nonetheless continued to be taxed to the corporation) ; lHelvering v. Leonard, 310
U.S. 80 (1940) (the grantor of a trust which is irrevocable will continue to be taxed
upon income from it unless he can successfully bear the burden of proving that application of the income from the trust principal does not relieve him from a continuing obligation such as one arising from his guarantee as to trust principal and income) ; Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935) (it is not necessary that a taxpayer own the source of
income to be taxable upon the income from it, at least where tY e income from the source
is used to satisfy the taxpayer's legal obligation and he at one time had owned the
source which he transferred with directions that the income bc" used to satisfy his legal
obligation); Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933) (an assignor of even an admitted
property interest in a fund may continue to be taxed upon its eirnings if he intentionally
devoted the fund at some past time to a purpose he desired but was not legally obligated
to effectuate); Sewell v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 957 (Ct. CI. 1947) (a taxpayer's
transfer of stock to his wife did not relieve him of income ta: liability upon subsequent
dividends from that stock where the taxpayer continued to hav control of the dividends;
the court held irrelevant the fact that the wife, not the taxpayer, owned the stock.)
6. Teschner v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 1003 (1962) (an "tmrner" of amounts which
he never had a right to receive himself was not taxable when the amounts derived from
his efforts were paid to his designee) ; Commissioner v. Tow.er, 327 U.S. 280 (1946)
(a capital investment in a partnership by a wife was not suficient for partnership income to be attributed to her where the total income transaction indicated that her husband was the proper taxpayer, a factual question) ; Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U.S.
293 (1946) (even though a wife in a husband-wife partnership really owned part of the
capital of the partnership, the Supreme Court affirmed a holding of the Tax Court attributing all of the partnership income to the husband upon tie basis that the question
was one of "fact" notwithstanding the fact that the Tax Court had not inquired into the
extent to which the total partnership earnings were attributable to services performed
by the husband rather than to partnership capital); Pearce v. Commissioner, 315 U.S.
543 (1942) (even though the assignee of a source of income owns it absolutely, nevertheless he will not be taxable upon income from it if the source was transferred to him
by virtue of an anticipatory assignment; and the determination of taxability will be
subject to the same test as that applied to determine the continued taxability of the
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Prove the metaphor for a bit. The owner of a source of income
usually (but not always) has two distinct and severable rights: (1) rights
of ownership of the source itself; (2) rights to receive in due course the
income from the source. Under the negative implication of the metaphor, an owner of a "tree" (the income source) may assign with impunity his right to receive the income (the "fruit") so long as he concurrently transfers his ownership of the source. Yet if he owned only
the right to receive the income, but did not own the source itself, he
would be taxed on the identical assigned income since he was assigning
away a naked right to receive the fruit. Such contrary results would
want only in logical consistency, of course, an ingredient which has never
been a primary component of federal income tax law.
Besides being irrational, however, the metaphor has frustrated an
orderly evolution of a generic anticipatory assignment principle. Traditionally it has been used only in the area of gratuitous inter vivos assignments of rights to receive amounts in the future which, if received by the
assignor in due course of events, would have constituted income to the
assignor (hereinafter "gift assignments of income"); in such cases, the
assignor has been subjected to income tax when his assignee receives the
amounts at a future time.' But there are two other major fields of fedassignor on the income from the source.)

See also, Mallinkrodt v. Nunan, 146 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1945) (where the trustees of
a grandfather trust were to pay income of the trust to the son of the grantor "upon his
request"; held that even though the specific trust provision would have subjected the
trustee rather than the son to income tax upon the trust earnings, the son was nevertheless the proper taxpayer ". . . 'because the power of the petitioner to receive this trust
income each year, upon request, can be regarded as the equivalent of ownershin of the
income for purposes of taxation."); Fellows Sales Co. v. United States, 200 F.
Supp. 347 (S.D. S.D. 1961) (holding that a corporation was not taxable upon the 5%
of its profits which it collected in trust for a third party who did not own any portion
of the corporate assets).
7. Hicks v. United States, 314 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1963) (holding that an employee
who had in 1957 exercised a direction that some of his compensation income payable in
1958 should instead be paid directly into a profit sharing trust was liable, under the
doctrine of constructive receipt, when the payments to the trustee were made in 1958).
If an assignment is itself an economic benefit to the assignor, then income would be
realized by the assignor at the time of assignment; the difficulty inherent in measuring
the benefit should not compel a contrary result. But in the absence of a determinable
economic benefit at the time of assignment, income is realized by the assignor when his
assignee receives the amounts which would have been received by the assignor absent the
assignment. The theory of deferred realization was first expressed at SM-3303, IV-1
Cum. BuLL. 132, 134 (1925) :
It is apparent from the foregoing authorities that a valid assignment of a portion of the income from a life estate does not vest present interest in such income in the assignee, but merely impresses the fund with a lien enforceable only
when the income accrues. It is further apparent from these authorities that
such rights are enforceable only on the theory that the assignment is an agreement, or creates an obligation, to transfer when the right of the assignor becomes fixed.
Query (1) whether an accrual basis assignor would realize income at the time when the
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eral income tax law where a properly defined assignment principle would
be determinative of proper income tax consequences: (1) situations
where taxpayers sell or otherwise transfer for a valuable consideration
rights to receive amounts in the future which, if received by the transferor
in due course of events, would have constituted income to him (hereinafter "sale assignments of income") ; and (2) cases concerning transfers,
by bequest, devise, or inheritance, of decedents' rights to receive amounts
in the future, which, if received by the decedent in due course of events
had he lived, would have constituted income to him (hereinafter "death
assignments of income").
The future will be writ largely within the bounds of a definitive,
universal principle of anticipatory assignments of income. But a seemly
regard for history extorts us to look first at gift assignments of income
where the tree-fruit metaphor has enjoyed acceptance without study for
many a year. Let us dissect the metaphor upon its own terms and in its
own province.
II.
The typical gift assignment of income case arises where a high
bracket taxpayer, anticipating the receipt of amounts in the future which
will be taxable as income to him when received, assigns away his right to
receive those amounts in the future. Human nature being what it is, the
transfer is usually made to a natural object of the transferor's bounty
and is gratuitous in the sense that no legal consideration is received. The
most fabled such occurrence arose in the case of Lucas v. Earl,8 where
Mr. Justice Holmes wrote:
rights transferred to his assignee "accrue" within the norma concepts of income tax
accruability even if the assignee is on the cash basis, and (2) whether an assignor might
realize income both at the time of assignment under the economic benefit theory and
again (to the extent of any excess of amounts received by the assignee over the assignor's economic benefit at the time of assignment) when his assignee receives (or
would normally accrue) the referent amounts?
8. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
A basic assumption of the Earl case was that, by definition, the end sought to be achieved by an anticipatory arranger of his tax affairs would
be to prevent the income when paid from vesting in him "even for a second." The holding of the case, as distinguished from Holmes' dictum, is therefore clearly restricted to
anticipatory arrangements to deflect income from the one who would, absent the arrangement, have received it in due course.
The anticipatory assignment principle, as distinguished from the metaphor, is valid
but demands a rationale. Not the least important incident of the revisitation of the
theory here attempted may be the disclosure that the Commissioner as well as specific
courts have been inexcusably neglective in allowing taxpayers to free themselves from
income tax upon what would have been income to them in due course of events absent
an assignment of admitted rights to receive amounts. Perhaps the law should be that
all taxpayers continue in perpetuity to be liable to pay incomc taxes upon incomes they
would have received, absent anticipatory assignments, unless fairness dictates otherwise.
See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948): "The principles [of Clifford and
Horst] . . . are [but] guideposts for those who seek to determine in a particular in-
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. . .there is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to
those who earned them and provide that the tax could not be
escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however
skilfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting
even for a second in the man who earned it. That seems to us
the import of the statute before us and we think that no distinction can be taken according to motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from
that on which they grew.9
The Court held that an assignment of income of a law partnership to
be earned in the future was not effectual to transfer from a lawyerhusband to his wife income tax liability upon those earnings.
The courts eagerly accepted the invitation that the inquiry they
should make in gift assignment cases demands but a determination as to
whether the assignor transferred only income fruit or also assigned a
capital tree. In Leininger,'° for example, the Supreme Court held that a
husband could not relieve himself of income tax upon his distributive
share of partnership earnings, averring that the unassigned tree which
produced the income was not the husband's partnership interest but was
rather the partnership entity itself. The Clifford case' similarly taught
that whether the grantor of a five-year trust should continue to be taxable upon its income was to be decided, not by reference to whether he
had or could in due course have had sufficient ownership of the trust
income to warrant a tax, but rather by an inquiry into whether he remained owner of the corpus of the trust itself. And to this very day
statutory provisions cohtrolling the taxability of trust grantors proceed
on the Clifford assumption that the tax is properly predicated only upon
stance whether such an assignor retains sufficient control over the assigned contracts or
over the receipt of income by the assignee to make it fair to impose income tax liability
on him." Id. at 606.

9. 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930).
10. Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136 (1932).
11. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940). It is not apparent why Mr. Justice Douglas directed his inquiry towards whether the taxpayer owned the corpus rather
than whether he owned the income. The case was based upon section 22(a) of the
Revenue Act of 1934 which concluded by subjecting to tax ".

any source whatever."

.

. income derived from

Douglas preferred, however, to decide the case within the scope

of the prior specific language: "Gains . . . derived from . . .dealings in property . . .

growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property." At least two
criticisms may be made of that analysis: (1) if one receives income from "property,"
there is nothing implicit in even the particular statutory language which requires that the
recipient of income therefrom must own the property itself; (2) since one who anticipatorily assigns away his right to receive income continues to be taxable upon it, there
was no necessity for the court even to discuss ownership of the property from which the
income was derived.
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the legal fiction that grantors retain an ownership interest in corpus.' 2
The Blair and Schaffnwr cases' perhaps most clearly illumine the
discordant chords of the tree-fruit metaphor. In Blair,4 the taxpayer
was the life beneficiary of all of the income from a trust and assigned the
right to receive all of the income from a portion of the corpus for his
lifetime to his children. Despite the fact that in due course the taxpayer
would have received all of the trust income, except for the assignment,
the Court held that the taxpayer was not taxable or the amounts he assigned since the assignment of portions of his beneficial interest for his
lifetime were "not the assignment of a chose in action but of the right,
title and estate in and to property. . . .""
Sclaffner differed from Blair only in that Mrs. Schaffner, also a
life beneficiary of trust income, assigned to her children specified
amounts from the trust income for the year following the assignments.
The taxpayer urged the applicability of the Blair theory that an assignment of a right to receive income from a trust was really an assignment
of a fractional "right, title and estate in and to property." The Court
rejected the taxpayer's argument that she had assigned a property tree:
It is said that . . . each assignee in the present case is a donee
of an interest in the trust property for the term of a year and
is thus the recipient of income from his own property which is
taxable to him rather than to the donor ...
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 [hereinafter "1954 CODE"] § 671 ("trust income, deductions, and credits attributable to grantors and others as substmtial owners") states in
part:
Where it is specified in this subpart that the grantor or arother person shall be
treated as the owner of any portion of a trust, there shall then be included in
computing the taxable income and credits of the grantor or the other person
those items of income . . . which are attributable to that portion of the trust
to the extent that such items would be taken into account . . . in computing
taxable income or credits against the tax of an individual ...
And 1954 CODE § 678 ("person other than grantor treated as substantial owner") pro-

vides:
(a) General Rule-A person other than the grantor shell be treated as the
owner of any portion of a trust with respect to which:
(1) Such person has a power exercisable solely by himself to vest the

corpus or the income therefrom in himself, or

(2) Such person has previously partially released or otherwise modified

such a power and after the release or modification retains such control
as would, within the principles of sections 671 to 577, inclusive, subject
a grantor of a trust to treatment as the owner thereof.
13. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S.
579 (1941).
14. Perhaps it was in the Blair case where Mr. Chief Justice Hughes initiated the
conceptual difficulty with the "earner" cases by remarking that "The tax here is not
upon earnings which are taxed to the one who earns them." 300 U.S. at 11.
15. 300 U.S. at 13-14.
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We think that the operation of the statutes taxing income is not
dependent upon such "attenuated subtleties," but rather on the
import and reasonable construction of the taxing Act.1"
The Blair-Schaffner dichotomy ostensibly licenses the courts to distinguish between horizontal and vertical assignments of rights to receive
income: a vertical severance of the income source will effectually transfer a "title" to a portion of the source itself whereas a horizontal divestment of a right to receive the same total amounts would leave title to the
entire source in the assignor. The distinction is legitimate only in direct
ratio to the validity of the theory that ownership of the source of income
7
correctly under-girds the anticipatory assignment philosophy.'
The most famous anticipatory assignment case of all, Horst,8 held
that the donor of negotiable interest coupons which he had detached from
bonds which he continued to own remained taxable upon the coupon interest when received by his donee. The holding is consonant with the
tree-fruit metaphor approach to income assignments, of course, but closer
attention to the Court's language reveals that it is really an incipient right
to receive income in due course'9 rather than mere ownership of the
source of the income which precludes an assignor from evading taxes on
the assigned income:
Underlying the reasoning in these cases is the thought that
income is "realized" by the assignor because he, who owns or
controls the source of the income, also controls disposition of
that which he could have received himself and diverts the payment from himself to others as the means of procuring the
16. 312 U.S. at 581.
17. Any attempted distinction of the Schaffner and Blair cases would necessarily
be sophistical. In both cases the taxpayers owned only naked rights to receive amounts
which in due course, absent the assignments, would have constituted income to them when
received. In neither case were the assigned portions of trust income "derived from"
what the taxpayer owned. The Blair case cannot stand logical analysis; but perhaps
even more interesting in the context of our discussion is the fact that both cases negatively imply that income derived from property may properly be taxed to a taxpayer
even though the taxpayer does not own the property from which the income is derived.
Another interesting implication of Blair is that it is inconsistent with the Commissioner's theory of the "earner": that is, that the rendition of services will itself constitute the "tree" of the metaphor. If Blair was correct in assuming that a life tenant
of trust income has a sufficient beneficial interest in the res which may serve as the
"tree" in the metaphor, there is no reason why the business enterprise from which any
earnings are derived by an "earner" could not also be taken to be the source of the income and thus preclude the services themselves from being regarded as the tree within
the meaning of the metaphor.
18. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
19.

".

.

. here respondent, owner of the bonds, had acquired the legal right to de-

mand payment at maturity of the interest specified by the coupons and the power to
command its payment to others, which constituted an economic gain to him." 311 U.S.
at 115.
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satisfaction of his wants. The taxpayer has (qually enjoyed
the fruits of his labor or investments and obtained the satisfaction of his desires whether he collects and uses the income to
procure those satisfactions, or whether he disposes of his right
to collect it as the means of procuring them.2"
Because owners of income-producing assets almost invariably have the
"right to receive" the income produced by those assets, chances are remote
indeed that the tree-fruit metaphor ever would have been properly tested
absent the Commissioner's usage of it in an earned income controversy.
The Commissioner has long reasoned, along with scores of others,
that it is in the nature of things for taxability of gift assignments of income to be decided by the tree-fruit metaphor rather than under disturbing concepts like "ownership" and "control" of the future income itself.
Since "earned" income by definition is income attributable to personal
services, it is presumably apparent that the "tree" of the metaphor in a
personal service controversy would be the services themselves. The Commissioner found it easy to define the person who renders services as an
"earner" and to conclude, as conclude he has, that since an earner cannot
possibly divest himself of the tree (that is, the personal services which
were the source of the income) ". . . whenever A receives something of
value attributable to services performed by B, B, the earner, is the proper
taxpayer."' 2x
For the first time anywhere, the tree-fruit metaphor had been challenged absolutely: is one to be taxed upon income from a source merely
because he retains ownership of the source itself ; or should the metaphor
itself be rejected in favor of an inquiry into whether the taxpayer at one
time had voluntarily divested himself of a right to receive in due course
the income from the source?
The moment of truth had arrived. If the metaphor could stand its
proving in an earned income context, its utility would continue and
properly so. But if the metaphor could not survive its testing in that
area, it would not merit continued vitality in any since it long had pretended to conclude all anticipatory assignment cases. The issue was impressive and perhaps it is unfortunate that its resolution did not arise
from the proverbial "big, big case."
20. 311 U.S. at 116-17.
21.

(1962).

Reply Brief for Respondent, p. 6, Teschner v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 1003

596
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III.

If it is true that "great cases make bad law," then it is equally precise to say that conventional cases can make great law. This might well
be true of the Tax Court case of Teschner et ux. v. Commissioner,22 which
arose from a contest situation where a taxpayer-father had entered an
essay contest and, being unable to qualify for a prize under the rules of
the contest, had designated his daughter to receive any prize which might
subsequently have been awarded. A prize (an annuity policy) was in
fact awarded to his daughter and the Commissioner sought to include in
the father's income the full value of the prize. The stipulated and proven
facts clearly disclosed that there had been no actual or constructive receipt by the taxpayer-father of any amount and that the relationship of
the "earner" to the recipient of the prize was irrelevant.
The Petitioners, in their original brief, had relied upon three cases
incidentally to support the proposition that a father's services from which
his child receives income will not alone justify imposition of an income
tax against the father.2" The Commissioner, observing that there was a
22. Teschner v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 1003 (1962), non acq. 1964- 1 Cum.BULL. 6.
The subsequent history of the case is probably of more than casual interest to students of
tax procedure. On December 27, 1962, the Commissioner filed a Petition for Review with
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. By stipulation, the time
within which the Commissioner could transmit the record on review was extended to
April 26, 1963, and on April 20 the record on review was in fact filed with the Seventh
Circuit. On May 1, 1963, the Commissioner advised the taxpayers that he had decided
not to pursue his appeal of the Tax Court's decision and submitted a Stipulation for
Dismissal to them for signature.
The taxpayers refused to sign the Stipulation for Dismissal and on May 16, 1963,
the Commissioner filed a Motion to Dismiss his appeal. The taxpayers filed an Answer
which, inter alia, ".

.

. respectfully suggest[ed] that the Court, in ruling upon said

Motion to Dismiss . . . consider whether this case presents important questions fundamental to a proper administration of the income tax laws of the United States ... "
Notwithstanding the Suggestion, however, on May 21, 1963, the Commissioner's Petition
for Review was summarily dismissed (Docket No. 14157) by the Seventh Circuit.
Case comments on the Teschner case have appeared at 48 MiNN. L. REV. 815 (1964);
24 MoNT. L. Rv.183 (1963); 1962 U. ILL. L.F. (1962); 18 J. TAxATioN 5 (1963).
The comments in the Minnesota and Montana Reviews concluded that the Teschner case
had been correctly decided although concern was expressed in each instance as to the
implications of the case for tax evasion schemes. It should be remembered, however,
that the Commissioner always has a very strong presumption of regularity running in his
favor in all of the cases and that the burden will always be on the taxpayer to prove
that he never in fact had a "right to receive" the income in point.
The authors of the comment in the University of Illinois Law Forum, writing before it was known that the Commissioner would dismiss his appeal, concluded that there
was

". .

. little doubt that this issue will ultimately be decided in favor of the Com-

missioner in view of the broad sweep of the opinion of the Supreme Court on this subject and the ramifications of the Tax Court's decision if upheld." One may query
whether the authors of such statements have been properly exposed to the general principles upon which our Western society is based.
23. Visintainer v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 519, 523-24 (10th Cir. 1951):
To say that the gifts were ineffective for income tax purposes would be the
equivalent of holding that a father is disenabled to make a gift to his minor
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vital distinction between those cases and the taxpayer's case because
while ".

.

. managerial and custodial services were rendered in each [of

those cases] by the donor parent, the income was attributable to property,
not personal services," 2 explained to the taxpayers and the Tax Court
that there was a vital, far-reaching, fundamental di.tinction between income from "property" and income from personal services:
Petitioners have completely failed to meet the issue here
presented, that earned income must be taxed to its earner, notwithstanding any anticipatory arrangement. Although .
there appears at last a glimmer of recognition of the futility for
tax purposes of the assignment merely of income itself, apart
child which is effective in point of tax consequences if he retains or subsequently exercises any control or management of the property or the fruits
therefrom solely for the benefit of the estate of the child. Neither the letter
nor the spirit of revenue legislation extends its reach that far...
See also, Alexander v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 753, 755 (5th Cir. 1951) :
We find in the father's vicarious management of the property for his son
nothing which justifies visiting the tax consequences of the enterprise upon
the father as the 'owner' of the income. There is a distiaction between managerial control over income producing property with the consent of the actual
owner, and the absolute right of control over both the property and the income
derived therefrom which inheres in a valid legal title ....
See also the second Alexander case, Alexander v. Commissioner, 194 F.2d 921, 925
(5th Cir. 1952):
To say that the profits derived from Frances' land and cattle . . . were merely
because in each instance the father helped his child by attending to necessary
business details, attributable to the parent and not to the children, is completely specious reasoning. It is to deny the fundamental ;erities of the traditional parent and child, father and daughter, relationship ex sting in America....
See also Kohnstamn v. Pedrick, 153 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1945). In that case, the taxpayer
had transferred certain assets to a trustee who was his wife, the trustee being directed
to collect the income and to divide it into four equal parts, one part for the wife of the
taxpayer and one for each of his three children. The Comm.-sioner sought to tax the
father upon the income from the children's shares upon the ground that the mother
constantly consulted the father in the management of the children's affairs and that
such a consultation, which presumably was followed by the mother-trustee, constituted
income to the father. Learned Hand responded:
[W)e cannot understand on what conceivable theory the income from the investment made by the children's mother is to be taken as the plaintiff's [i.e.,
their father's]. The defendant suggests nothing to support this extraordinary
position except that she uniformly consulted her husband a'bout what she should
do. It would indeed add terror to marital confidences, iU, whenever a woman
asked her husband's advice, sporadically or uniformly, about what to do with
their children's money, she took the chance that their income would be added
to his for purposes of taxation. It may be that for ta=x purposes the jural
indissolubility of the family will in the end be restored to the position it occupied in Archaic law; but, so far, that has not happened.
Id. at 510.
24. Reply Brief for Respondent, p. 8, Teschner v. Conunissioner, 38 T.C. 1003
(1962). The Commissioner is a bit too cavalier in his distinction between income from
"property" and income from personal services. Precise analysi of the source of any income will probably disclose that the income is attributable both to personal services and
to "property" albeit perhaps not property owned by the taxpay'r.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
from any income-producing property or res, Petitioners have
scrupulously failed throughout their brief to discuss the question of earned income. Respondent respectfully submits that
this failure is not without good reason for any discussion must
inevitably lead to the conclusion that such income must be taxed
to the earner thereof. (Emphasis in Commissioner's original
brief.)"
The Commissioner urged that the result in the case had to be the same as
if the law firm which employed the taxpayer had required the insertion
of a provision in his contract of employment to the effect that in consideration of his services in 1957 he would receive a certain amount
directly and an additional amount would be payable to his daughter."0
The taxpayers responded by observing that the record in the case
was barren of any factual evidence whatever of an anticipatory arrangement of any kind. The case had to be decided upon the record, not by
25. Reply Brief for Respondent, p. 8, Teschner v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 1003
(1962).
Before the Commissioner could utilize the anticipatory assignment "earner"
cases, he found it necessary to classify the amounts paid to the taxpayer's daughter as
"compensation" income. The 1954 CODE had made academic, in the ordinary gift situation, a determination whether or not a prize or award would constitute "compensation,"
1954 CODE § 74, stating in part that "...
gross income includes amounts received as
prizes and awards."
The Commissioner, nevertheless, utilized three pre-1954 cases to establish the proposition that an amount paid as a prize or award would constitute income in the nature of
compensation: Malcolm McDermott, 3 T.C. 929 (1944), reversed, 150 F.2d 585 (D.C.
Cir. 1945) (holding that the Ross essay prize won 'by a lawyer was taxable; but the
Court of Appeals reversed on the theory that the payment to the taxpayer had been
donative in nature) ; Herbert Stein, 14 T.C. 494 (1950) (which held that a prize awarded
an economist for his winning essay on an employment plan constituted taxable income
which was "gain or compensation for labor") ; and Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S.
711 (1952) (which held that a contest award for the submission of a musical composition was taxable income.) The Commissioner also relied upon the proposition enunciated
by Robertson that the "discharge of legal obligations-the payment for services rendered or consideration paid pursuant to a contract-is in no sense a gift. Where the
payment is in return for services rendered, it is irrelevant that the donor derived no economic benefit from it."
In their original brief, the taxpayers pointed out in reply to the Commissioner's
"compensation" classification of the award that in each of the three cases the taxpayer
had submitted a professional work-product in a commercial contest. In the case before
the Tax Court, the fifty word essay had never been published nor circularized, the taxpayer had never been accorded any recognition, and even testified upon trial that he
thought he was "being rather unfairly ignored by everyone involved."
26. The case had not been submitted as a completely stipulated case; rather the
taxpayer had testified in some detail to sufficient basic facts clearly to justify a factual
finding that there was nothing whatever which the taxpayer did to preclude the award
from coming to him or which he could have done to have received the award in the
first place. It is vital, in appraising the significance of the Teschner case, to remember
that all anticipatory assignment cases are predicated upon the particular facts of each
case and that it would be doubtful indeed that a normal employer-employee relationship
would ever support an employee's argument that he could not have received the amounts
attributable to his personal services in due course.
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a general proposition, asserted the taxpayer; and simple dictionary definitions demanded that before there can be an "anticipatory assignment"27
a taxpayer must have been able to exercise both volition and choice as to
the disposition of a right to receive future income -xhich he himself could
have received in due course. The Commissioner would have substituted
for such volition and choice, and also for the existence of a right to receive future income in due course, the mere fact that one of the taxpayers voluntarily chose to write a fifty word essay when he knew that
the contest rules precluded him from eligibility himself to receive a
prize.2" But it was clear, concluded the taxpayers, that at least obiter dicta
of the Commissioner's own rulings,29 the Tax Court decisions,"0 and even
27. The Commissioner had used the phrase "anticipatory arrangement" rather than
"anticipatory assignment" in his original brief, apparently upon the theory that the term
"assignment" might be construed to require that the res assigned must once have had at
least a potential existence in the "assignor." The taxpayers rejected the Commissioner's
use of the term "arrangement," however, asserting that it w as nothing more than an
emotive expression. In support of their proposition that an "arrangement" just like an
"assignment" must be based upon voluntary conduct and req~lires the existence of alternatives, the taxpayer cited the case of Union Mortgage Banking & Trust Co. v.
Hagood, 97 Fed. 360, 364 (D.S.C. 1899) which had stated:
The Century Dictionary defines "arrangement" thus: "preparatory measure or
negotiation; previous disposition or plan; preparation. .. "
Webster defines [it] . . . to mean "preparatory measure. . . ." In this case
the parties were preparing for a loan. All the terms were distinctly stated...
At first they differed. . . . Mrs. Hagood wanted $5,000. The . . . banking
company offered $4,000. . . . This was accepted; thot is to say, this arrangement preparatory to the execution of the papers was made and concluded then.
28. The approach is a natural unfoldment from the corrosive postulate once pronounced by Holmes in McAuliffe the New Bedford, 155 Mas3. 216 (1892) ("the Petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but he Las no constitutional right
to be a policeman.")
29. S.M. 3303, TV-1 Cu. BuLL. 132 (1925). The life tcnant of a trust estate had
assigned in advance future income to her husband and some of her children. The various
common law theories of assignments were discussed in some detail; after reviewing applicable cases, the Memorandum concluded by noting that the anticipatory assignment
doctrine required that the assignor must have had a fixed right to receive the amounts
in the future and, indeed, that the only justification for the doctrine was grounded in
that condition precedent:
It is apparent from the foregoing authority that a valid assignment of a portion of the income from a life estate does not vest present interest in such income in the assignee but merely impresses the fund with a lien enforceable only
when the income accrues. It is further apparent from these authorities that
such rights are enforceable only on the theory that the assignment is an agreement, or creates an obligation, to transfer when the right of the assignor
becomes f ixed.
Id. at 134. See also 0-912 [LO-912] 1 Cum. BuLL. 80 (1919). A partner had directed
in advance that a certain percentage of the profits of a partnership to which he would
othervwise have been entitled should be paid to charity. The opinion concluded that the
partner's attempt to divest himself of "income" was to no avail and emphasized that the
reason for the conclusion was that the partner, in due course, would have received
amounts and that ownership of those amounts by the assigninr.- partner was a condition
precedent to the application of the anticipatory assignment doctrine:
The taxpayer here directs his partners, who owe or will owe him money to the
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those of the Supreme Court,3 ' forecast the sine qua non of such a right
extent of his share of the profits, to pay a part of those profits to a third
person, the donee named in the assignment. It is nonetheless the income of
the taxpayer.
While the amount named in the assignment is never actually received by the
donor . . . he admits his right of ownership by the very act of executing the
assignment. The mere fact that it is received by his nominee rather than by
him, does not prevent it being his income.
Id. at 81.
30. Ormsby McKnight Mitchel, 1 B.T.A. 143 (1924). The Board of Tax Appeals
held that the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1916 which required a partner to include
in his income his distributive share of partnership profits could not be modified or
changed by an agreement made between a partner and a third person disposing of a
portion of the distributive share of the partner. The Board emphasized the requirement
that if the assignor-partner was to be held he must have had a right to receive amounts
in due course:
It does not alter the situation to say that as soon as income arises in the
partnership at that instant it becomes the property of the grantee, as this is
mere assertion. . . . The fallacy of the contention arises from the failure to
take account of the fact that the taxpayer is contracting to dispose of something which must first be his before it becomes the property of any one else...
As we have attempted to point out above, the defect in the case is the failure to
recognize the fact that the distributive share of the taxpayer in the profits of
the partnership constitutes income to him before it is disposed of. This is the
effect of the Act and is recognized by the agreement itself, for in the first
Article it provides: "The party of the second part shall be entitled to one-half of
the profit which shall come to the party of the first part from said firm." . . .
When Congress provides that a person in a certain status shall be subject to
taxation in a particular manner, we do not believe that person can, at one and
the same time, retain such status and by agreement relieve himself from the
effect of his act.
Id. at 149. And see Marion Stone Burt Lansill, 17 B.T.A. 413 (1929). The Board held
that an order by a taxpayer to his bank directing payment of a percentage of mineral
royalties which he was entitled to receive from the bank as trustee directly to a third
person did not eliminate those amounts from his "income":
The right in the taxpayer to receive the income at the time it is attributed and
taxed to him is likewise not essential, where . . . taxpayer has by his own
volition chosen to dispose of the right to receive it, or retaining that from
which the income is derived. The volition in disposing of the right is important for while all will agree that one who never received or had a right to
receive or who has involuntarily lost it should not be taxed, it is also plain
that his voluntary exercise of the right to dispose of the income before receipt
may be just as valuable and important practically as its exercise after receipt.
There is no reasonable ground for supposing that Congress intended . . . to
tax the one and relieve the other. The ability to pay in the case at Bar is
equally great whether the Petitioner received the entire royalty and then paid
the lawyer or told the bank to pay the lawyer directly out of the royalties.
Id. at 423.
31. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). The Washington law of community
property was non-consensual and the wife owned one-half of the community income
under it. The Court held that the husband could not be taxed upon his wife's share of
the community income even though he had broad powers of control, management and
alienation of his wife's share. The Commissioner argued that since the husband's
"earnings" were the income which he was seeking to tax, there had been an "anticipatory
arrangement" by the husband; but the Supreme Court pointed out that Lucas v. Earl was
not controlling since the ". . . very assignment in that case was bottomed on the fact
that the earnings would be the husband's property, else there would have been nothing
on which it could operate." Id. at 117. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 119 (1940) :
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to receive.
The Tax Court held for the taxpayers.32 Observing that income
taxes are imposed upon "the income of every individual" and that where
an individual neither receives nor has the right to receive income he is not
the taxable individual within the contemplation of the statute, the court
responded to the Commissioner's theory that "earners" are the proper
persons to be taxed. After first protesting the obscurity of the argument
on the point, the court discussed two alternatives: (1) if the Commissioner meant that all income is to be taxed to the person who "generates"
the income, then the Commissioner was simply wrong; (2) if the Commissioner used the term "earn" in its commonly accepted usage ("to
acquire by labor, service, or performance; to deserve and receive compensation") then his theory was intelligible but did not enfold the
particular case. After affirming that the anticipatory assignment doctrine had been expressly confined to situation ". . . 'when he who is entitled to receive it [i.e., the income derived from compensation] makes use
of his power to dispose of it in procuring satisfactions which he would
otherwise procure only by use of the money when received' . . .," the
court held that the power of designation given to the entrant was no reason for varying the well-settled rule.
Two concurring Tax Court judges observed that all of the Commissioner's own cases concerned with anticipatory assignments were expressly limited to situations where "one vested with the right to receive
income [does] not escape the tax by any kind of anticipatory arrangement, however skillfully devised. . . ." They agrecd, however, that one
The dominant purpose of the Revenue laws is the taxation of income to those
who earn or otherwise create the right to receive it and enjoy the benefit of
it when paid. . . . The tax laid . . . upon income "derivcd from . . . wages,
or compensation for personal services . . . in whatever form paid . . ." cannot fairly be interpreted as not applying to income derix ed from interest or
compensation when he who is entitled to receive it makes use of his power to
dispose of it in procuring satisfaction which he would otherwise procure only
by the use of the money when received ...
Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 580 (1941) :
We have held, following the reasoning of Lucas v. Earl . . . that one who is
entitled to receive, at a future date, interest or compensation for services and
who makes a gift of it by an anticipatory arrangement realizes taxable income quite as much as if he had collected the income and paid it over to the
object of his bounty.
32. Judge Russell E. Train presided at the trial and wrote the majority opinion
which included Judges Bruce, Fisher, Forrester, Drennen, Hoyt and Murdock; Judge
Howard A. Dawson, Jr. wrote a concurring opinion in which he was joined by Judge
Mulroney; a dissenting opinion was authored by Judge Craig S. Atkins for himself and
Judges Tietjens, Opper, Raum, Withey, Pierce and Scott. Of interest, albeit perhaps not
of much significance, is the early training of the dissenters: five of the seven formerly
worked either for the Treasury Department or the Tax Division of the Department of
Justice.
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who had only a power to dispose of income with no right to receive it
himself could nevertheless in the proper case be taxed upon the exercise
of his power if it resulted in an economic benefit to him. The Teschner
case was not concerned with any question of economic benefit, however,
so the case had been correctly decided."3
A vigorous dissenting opinion by seven of the sixteen Tax Court
judges quarreled with the proposition that a right to receive income in
due course is a condition precedent to the applicability of the anticipatory
assignment doctrine. The dissenters theorized that when the taxpayer
entered the contest with full knowledge of the rules, he exercised a power
to control income disposition and that the subsequent payment to his
designee ".

. . constituted the enjoyment and hence the realization of

the income" by the taxpayer. Declaring that the absence of a "right to
receive" was irrelevant, the dissenters proclaimed that the case was not
to be decided by "attenuated subtleties."4
33. The taxpayers had no quarrel with the proposition that an "earner" would
properly be subjected to income tax upon the fair market value of an "economic bene-

fit" attributable to the "earner's" services. Indeed, the taxpayers concluded their Reply
Brief with a specific reference to that possibility:
Finally, it should be remembered that the Respondent is not seeking to tax Petitioners upon a benefit received. If he had sought to tax them upon the value
of their hopes and aspirations attributable to their daughter's receipt of the
annuity policy we would have a different case; we need not be concerned here
with speculations as to whether a person could be taxed upon benefits derived
from sunlight and rain and cosmic rays although perhaps a disposition of this
case favorable to Respondent would be a condition precedent to his attempt
to tax such items. That is another matter.
Reply Brief for Petitioners, p. 39, Teschner v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 1003 (1962).
In the case of Frew v. Bowers, 12 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1926), Learned Hand commented upon the special dangers of an income tax not based on a benefit received or
which might have been received by a taxpayer:
Such a tax is fixed by the mere sport of fortune. It has no more relation to
the possessions or conduct of the taxpayer than if he were taxed upon the
subsequent value of property he has sold outright, or his estate were doubled
because he died on Wednesday. Such a law is far more capricious than merely
retroactive taxes. Those do indeed impose unexpected burdens, but at least
they distribute them in accordance with the taxpayer's wealth but this section
distributes them in accordance with another's wealth; that is a far more
grievous injustice.
Id. at 628.
34. The dissenters were themselves guilty of a somewhat "attenuated subtlety" in
refusing to discuss the next logical question: even if one "anticipatorily assigns" a right
to receive income, may the "assignor" be subjected to income tax if, at the time of
"assignment," a possibility that any amount whatever will be received is so remote as to
be negligible?
The answer is no, the relevant case being Cold Metal Process Co. v. Commissioner,
247 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1957). The question was whether a corporation which was dissolved in 1945 was properly subjected to income tax liability upon amounts received in
1949 by its sole stockholder. At the time of dissolution of the corporation, litigation was
pending in which the government was vigorously contesting the legal right of the corporation to receive the amounts which were later paid to the sole shareholder who had
acquired all of the corporate assets in the dissolution. The Commissioner argued that
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The most disturbing facet of the Teschner case is that the Commissioner and a significant number of dissenting Tax Court judges announced a theory which would extirpate from the anticipatory assignment doctrine the requirement that a taxpayer must once have had a right
himself to receive income in due course, either by taking or rejecting determinable action. Granting that "income" itself is only a concept, nonetheless it demands firm grounding in the roots of voluntary conduct.
The requisite volition is so basic to our tax system and the standards of
fair play implicit in an ordered society that taxpayers need not seek
refuge within the perilous confines of administrative discretion and judicial restraint. The gauntlet thrown by the Commissioner affronts the
the distribution to the sole stockholder of the contingent right to receive the income
constituted an "anticipatory assignment of income" so that the amount, when subsequenly paid to the stockholder, became taxable to the assignor-corporation.
In the course of reaching a decision in favor of the taxpayer, the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit noted the general rule that the anticipatory assignment of earned
income would not defeat an income tax, then continued (at p. 72) :
As stated by the Tax Court . . . the legal right to the income was being
strenuously contested by the government and there was no certainty at the time
of the transfer that the transferor's rights thereto would ever be established
or that the money would ever be paid to either the transferor or transferee.
The amount that might eventually be collected was tnliquidated. Having
previously held that by reason of the uncertainty of Cold Metal ever being able
to collect on any of its claims for infringement, such claims did not constitute
accrued income to it in 1945 . . . we have real difficulty in now ruling that
under the same circumstances and same uncertainty Cold Metal had nevertheless "earned" such income [at the time of liquidation]. . . . The facts
which prevented it from being accrued income in 1945 a-so prevented it from
being "earned" income at that time in the usually accepted meaning of the term.
Regardless of the terminology used with respect to the income, its taxability
depends on the actual circumstances existing at the time of the transfer. At
that time, it was not income to Cold Metal. It was an unliquidated chose in
action. Cold Metal divested itself of all title, interest and control over it at
that time. Later developments over which Cold Metal had no control transformed it into taxable income which was paid to and received by the new
owner for its sole use and benefit. These facts fall far" short of classifying
the transaction as an anticipatory assignment of income ttLxable to the assignor
when later paid. . . . Cold Metal's right was not a vested right in 1945....
We think that the absolute and unconditional assignment . . . of . . . a contingent right to income . . . payable, if at all, at some indefinite time in the
future in an indeterminate amount, with respect to which the assignor had no
voice or control whatsoever, prevents us from treating the case as one involving the anticipatory assignment of income which when paid becomes taxable to the assignor ...
To say that the dissenters should have reckoned with the ColU Metal case is not tantamount to approving that decision. Indeed, just as "income in respect of a decedent!'
should not be restricted by normal concepts of "accrual," so too the inquiry to be made
in cases involving gift assignments of income should not be so limited. The question
which should have been asked in Cold Metal was simple: did the contacts which the
corporation had with the amounts subsequently paid to the assignee suffice to make it
fair to attribute to Cold Metal the income for federal income tax purposes?
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Constitution itself."'
But it is not constitutional limitations with which we are concerned
here. Our venture seeks a truly universal application of the generic
35. Even without respect to the problems implicit in the sixteenth amendment itself, the fifth amendment is a further limitation upon congressional power to tax
"incomes." In the case of Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1931), the Supreme Court
held that a federal revenue act based upon a conclusive presumption that gifts made
within two years prior to the death of the donor were in "contemplation of death" violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The Court stated that a statute
which bases a tax ".

.

. upon an assumption of fact which the taxpayer is forbidden

to controvert is so arbitrary and unreasonable that it cannot stand." The Court further
pointed out that the restraint imposed on legislation by the due process clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments is identical. See also Lewis v. White, 56 F.2d 390,
391-92 (D.Mass. 1932) (".

. . [T]hat an attempt by Congress to measure the tax on

one person with reference to income from another would conflict with the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment seems clear. . . . [Nior does the fact that . . . the
possibility of evasion exists operate to extend the taxing powers of Congress to the
point where they can tax one person on the income of another when the income is
wholly and completely acquired and beyond any power or right in the taxpayer to reach
or control disposition in any manner whatsoever. ..
")
Hoeper v. Tax Commission of Wisconsin, 284 U.S. 206 (1931), was concerned with
the constitutionality of a Wisconsin income tax statute which authorized an assessment
against the husband of a tax computed on the combined total of his and his wife's incomes. Mr. Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, observed that a married woman in
Wisconsin owned property in her own right, then declared that the question presented
for decision was whether Wisconsin had power by an income tax law to measure the
husband's tax, not by his own income, but in part by that of another:
We have no doubt that, because of the fundamental conceptions which underlie
our system, any attempt by a state to measure the tax on one person's property
or income by reference to the property or income of another is contrary to due
process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. That which is
not in fact the taxpayer's income cannot be made such by calling it income....
The effort to tax B for A's property or income does not make B the owner
of that property or income, and whether the state has power to effect such a
change of ownership in our particular case is wholly irrelevant when no such
effort has been made. Under the law of Wisconsin the income of the wife does
not at any moment or to any extent become the property of the husband. He
never has any title to it, or controls any part of it. That income remains hers
until the tax is paid, and what is left continues to be hers after that payment.
The state merely levies a tax upon it.
Arbitrary and discriminatory provisions . . . cannot be justified by calling them
special regulations of the persons or relationships which are the object of the
discrimination. The present case does not fall within the principle that where
the legislature, in prohibiting a traffic or transaction as being against the policy
of the state, makes a classification, reasonable in itself, its power so to do is
not to be denied simply because some innocent article comes within the proscribed class. . . . Taxing one person for the property of another is a different matter. There is no room for the suggestion that [as against] . . . the
appellant and those similarly situated the Act is a reasonable regulation, rather
than a tax law.
Neither of the reasons advanced in support of the validity of the statute as
applied to the appellant justifies the resulting discrimination. The exaction is
arbitarary and is a denial of due process.
Id. at 215-16, 218. Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting, would have upheld the tax on the
premise that the State of Wisconsin was merely basing the tax against the husband upon his wife's income on the reasonable theory that ". . . in every probability [it] will
make his life easier and help to pay his bills." Fortunately, Holmes' reputation rests on
firmer stuff than his proficiency in domestic relations.
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principle of anticipatory assignments of income, a non-constitutional inquiry to be sure but one which has been liberated from restrictive concepts of the relevancy of the source of income. So when we look at sale
assignments and death assignments, as we do now, let us do so with conviction that the source of assigned income qua source is of no account to
the seeking of proper tax results. 6

IV.
A death assignment of income matures when a decedent's successor
sells or otherwise disposes of property which he had acquired by bequest,
devise or inheritance from a decedent. The question is whether amounts
realized upon the sale or other disposition are "income" to the transferor
or are to be regarded as a return of capital to him to the extent of the
value of the property at the time of death of the decedent. Proper resolution of that question also requires a generic anticipatory assignment
principle and it is not relevant that the identity of the taxable person will
differ from gift assignments where the assignor himself is taxed. Indeed, the precise purpose of the statutory provision taxing to a recipient
"income in respect of" a decedent 7 was to deflect "income" from the
assignor's final income tax return to that of his assignee while at the
same time preserving the character of the income when it arrives in the
hands of the recipient. 8 The mere change in the identity of the taxable
36.
37.
Sec.
(a)

See Part VI and notes 94-105 infra.
1954 CODE § 691 provides in part as follows:
691 Recipients of Income in Respect of Decedents.
Inclusion in Gross Income(1) General Rule.-The amount of all items of gross income in respect of a
decedent which are not properly includible in respect of the taxable period
in which falls the date of his death or a prior period . . . shall be in-

cluded in the gross income, for the taxable year when received, of:
(A) The estate of the decedent, if the right to receive the amount is
acquired by the decedent's estate from the decedent;
(B) The person who, by reason of the death of the decedent, acquires the right to receive the amount, if the right to receive the
amount is not acquired by the decedent's estate from the decedent; or
(C) The person who acquires from the de:edent the right to receive
the amount by bequest, devise, or inheritance, if the amount is
received after a distribution by the decedent's estate of such
right ...
38. 1954 CoDE § 691(a) (3) states:
(3) Character of Income Determined by Reference to DecedentThe right . . . to receive an amount shall be treated, in the hands of the

estate of the decedent or any person who acquired such right by reason of the
death of the decedent, or by bequest, devise, or inheritance from the decedent,
as if it had been acquired by the estate or such person in the transaction in
which the right to receive the income was originally derived and the amount
includable in gross income . . . shall be considered in the hands of the estate
or such person to have the character which it would have! had in the hands of
the decedent if the decedent had lived and received such amount.
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person does no violence to the concept of "income.""
Before 1942, when the income in respect of a decedent provision
became part of our federal income tax law,4" a recipient of amounts in
respect of a decedent had at least two arguments by which he could attempt to escape income taxation upon amounts received: (1) property
acquired by "bequest, devise or inheritance" is exempt from income taxation;41 (2) property acquired from a decedent by inheritance, etc. receives
a new tax basis in the hands of the recipient measured by the fair market
value of the property at the time of the decedent's death.4 The argument
was that until amounts exceeding the new date-of-death basis had been
recovered in respect of the property received from the decedent, the proceeds received by a decedent's successor constituted a mere "conversion
of corpus" and were not subject to income tax."3 This "conversion of
corpus" argument proved to be highly successful.
Insulation of a decedent's successor from income taxation left the
Commissioner with only one practical alternative: to tax in a decedent's
39. Richardson, Jr. v. United States, 294 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1961), where the Court
held that 1939 Code § 126 [1954 CODE § 691] was constitutional as applied to a decedent's
heirs who collected interest accrued on promissory notes owned by the decedent at the
time of his death. The Court held that the accrued interest did not become principal on
the decedent's death and that it was properly characterized as "income" at that time
with the result that:
If the decedent had lived and received the interest, it would have been taxable
income to him. We do not think it was an unconstitutional exercise of power
for Congress to exact the payment of the income tax on what is clearly income
from the person who actually received the income rather than from the decedent. . . . Congress in so doing deprives the taxpayer of no right and subjects him to no hardship, in that the taxpayer receives income with knowledge
of the statute and of the tax thereunder inherent in it at the time of its receipt.
294 F.2d at 598.
40. Revenue Act of 1942, § 134, 56 Stat 830 (1942).
41. 1954 CODE § 102; 1939 Code § 22(b)(3).
42. 1954 CODE § 1014; 1939 Code § 113 (a) (5). In relevant part, § 1014 reads as
follows:
Sec. 1014. Basis of Property Acquired from a Decedent.
(a) In General.-Except as otherwise provided in this section, the basis of
property in the hands of a person acquiring the property from a decedent or to
whom the property passed from a decedent shall, if not sold, exchanged, or
otherwise disposed of before the decedent's death . . ., be the fair market

value of the property at the date of the decedent's death.
While there are several technical definitions of "property acquired from a decedent,"
included among them is one which stipulates that "Property acquired by bequest, devise,
or inheritance, or by the decedent's estate from the decedent" will constitute such property. 1954 CODE § 1014(b) (1).
43. Nichols v. United States, 64 Ct. C1. 241 (1947); Wm.P. Blodgett, 13 B.T.A.
1243 (1928) (a partner died owning a right to receive a share of partnership profits;
held, that only amounts received by the executors which exceeded the date-of-death value
of the chose in action were income to the executors) ; Jackson B. Kemper, Administrator, 14 B.T.A. 931 (1928) (amounts due decedent for salary and bonus for periods prior
to his death were not income to his estate when collected by his administrator.)
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final income tax return 4 the value of rights to receive amounts which
would have constituted income to him had he lived and received them in
due course. Such an approach was first utilized in the Revenue Act of
1926 which provided that where a decedent had been reporting income
on the installment basis, his death would be deemed a disposition of the
installment obligation and the difference between its fair market value at
the time of death and the decedent's basis would be income in the decedent's final return.4" To the objection that the result was to tax unrealized gain, the courts responded that installment reporting was a privilege and the decedent had consented to the treatment.46
The consensual theory applied to installment sles was not an adequate answer to the basic problem. If a decedent had been on a cash
basis, for example, his final return included only cash receipts as income." For the definition of taxable income to vary in accordance with
a discretionary accounting method was irrational, so in the Revenue Act
of 1934 Congress sought to catch the subsequent untaxed proceeds:
[I]n the case of the death of a taxpayer, there shall be included in the gross income for the taxable period in which falls
the date of his death, amounts accrued up to the date of his
death if not otherwise properly includable in respect of such
period or a prior period.4"
The important Enright case4' held that the statatory provision comprehended an accruable claim of a cash basis decedent at the time of his
death albeit such a claim was based only on quantum meruit5 The theory
44. 1954 CODE § 6012 ("Persons Required to Make Returns of Income") reads in
part as follows:
(b) Returns made by Fiduciaries . . .
(1) Returns of Decedents.-If an individual is dectased, the return of
such individual required . . . shall be made by his er:ecutor, administrator
or other person charged with the property of such dcedent.
45. 44 Stat. 23 (1926).
46. Crane v. Helvering, 76 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1935).
47. See Parlin, Accruals to Date of Death for Income Tax Purposes, 87 U. PA. L.
REv. 295 (1939) ; May, Taxable Income and Accomting Bases for Determining It, 40 J.
AccouNTANcy 248 (1925).
48. 48 Stat. 694 (1934).
49. Helvering v. Enright, 312 U.S. 636 (1941). Enright was a member of a law
partnership, the partnership agreement having provided that the estate of a deceased
partner would receive the partner's share of subsequent receipts on account of business
that had been unfinished at the partner's death. Against the contention that a right to
receive payment was a prerequisite to accrual, the court responded that accrual as used
in the statute was meant to further the policy of including in the decedent's final return
all income earned during his life even though the right was based on quantum meruit.
50. Quantum eruit ("as much as he deserves") is a proper basis for recovery of
payment for services performed, but only if the worker had rio express contract for a
stipulated recovery for his services. It ". . . refers to that class of obligations imposed
by law, without regard to the intention or assent of the partics bound, for reasons dic-
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of the case also embraced a claim which matured solely by reason of the
decedent's death, as where contractual obligations forming a condition
precedent to the decedent's right to receive income could be fully performed only by his death.5 ' There were of course serious and fundamental limitations upon the efficacy of the accrual-by-death rationale ;12
but rampant criticism of it was based not so much upon the fact that a
cash basis decedent was equated with an accrual taxpayer as upon the
grounds that there was often included as a decedent's income in his final
return amounts which had not "accrued" by any recognized accounting
standard."
The Revenue Act of 1942" 4 promulgated a new pattern for taxing
amounts received by successors in interest of decedents when those
amounts result to a sufficient extent from the decedent's income-seeking
lifetime activities. The accounting provisions were changed so as to eliminate the necessity for bunching income in a decedent's final return merely
because of his death; concurrently, however, the concept of taxable income was expanded to provide that the recipient of "income in respect of
a decedent" shall be taxable on such income.55
The critics of the concept of "bunching" of income in a decedent's
final return were elated to discover that the theory had been abandoned
completely."6 There was no longer even an option available to a detated by reason and justice. The form of the action is contract, but they are not contracts because the parties do not fix the terms and their intentions are disregarded."
Carpenter v. Josey Oil Co., 26 F.2d 442, 443 (8th Cir. 1928).
51. First Nat'l Bank v. Manning, 100 F. Supp. 892 (D. N.J. 1951). The decedent had contracted with his employer that if he should die before a certain date his
estate would receive what would have been his remaining salary. The amount received
by the estate was taxable in the decedent's final return since the right to payments accrued at the very instant of his death.
52. See Commissioner v. Alldis' Estate, 140 F.2d 885 (6th Cir. 1944), where the
decedent at the time of his death had owned 100 shares of beneficial interest in the
Chrysler Management Trust. Prior to his death, the decedent had contracted for the
sale of the shares to the Trust, the sale to be effective upon his death. Thel Court
held that the appreciation in value of the shares during the decedent's lifetime was not
taxable in his final return under the pre-1942 Section 42 of the 1939 Code.
53. See Gemmill, Accruals to Date of Death for Income Tax Purposes,90 U. PA.
L. Rxv. 702 (1942) ; Wentz, Distortion of Income Tax Occasioned by Death and the
Misapplicatiois of GraduatedRates, 19 TAXEs 707 (1941).
54. Revenue Act of 1942, § 134, 56 Stat. 830 (1942).
55. Revenue Act of 1942, §§ 134(a), (c), (e). The "Income in Respect of Decedents" provision was added (see note 31 supra) and the generic definition of income
was expanded to include as a component of "Gross Income" items of "Income in Respect
of a Decedent" [see 1954 Cona § 61(a) (14)].
56. Because of the new concept of "Income in Respect of Decedents," bunching of
income items in a decedent's final return had become unnecessary. Accordingly, 1939
Code § 42 [1954 CoDE § 451(b)] which had required bunching in the decedent's
final return was changed [by Revenue Act of 1942, § 134(a)] to read:
[I]n the case of the death of a taxpayer whose net income is computed upon
the basis of the accrual method of accounting, amounts (except amounts in-
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cedent's successor to include as income in his final return items which
would not have been includable under his lifetime accounting method. 7
Final returns of cash basis decedents were to be computed on the cash basis, " returns of accrual basis decedents were to be computed on the normal accrual basis," and subsequently received income in respect of a decedent was taxable to a recipient if it was not includable in the decedent's
final return."0
Perhaps a major contribution which the theory of death assignments
will make to a generic anticipatory assignment principle will be the statutory concept of relation back. Both the holding period of assets giving
rise to income in respect of a decedent and the character of income when
received by a decedent's successor shall be determined as if the decedent
had lived and received the proceeds. 1 Also, since income in respect of a
decedent usually will constitute a subsequent fruition of determinable
rights to receive income which were includable in the decedent's gross
estate for estate tax purposes, a deduction is granted the person who is
62
taxable on the income which is called a "deduction for estate tax.
Income in respect of a decedent is of course not restricted by the
concepts of what would properly have been income reportable in a decludable in computing a partner's net income under [1939 Code] Section 182)
accrued only by reason of the death of the taxpayer shall not be included in computing net income for the period in which falls the date of the taxpayer's death.
57. Estate of Fred Basch, 9 T.C. 627 (1947). The decedent had been on the cash
basis. His executor included in the decedent's final return employment bonuses and
commissions which were not determined until after death. The Tax Court upheld the
Commissioner's exclusion of these amounts from decedent's fnal return and remarked
that the only theory of inclusion would be constructive receipt since the decedent had
bien on the cash basis.
58. The cash basis of accounting defers recognition of income until money is received (or constructively received); the principal criticism o this accounting method
is probably that it fails to coordinate the rendering of servic~s and the recognition of
income. The most common exception to a strict requirement of receipt by a cash basis
taxpayer is that if cash is "subject to a man's unfettered conmmand and . . . he is free
to enjoy it at his own option . . ." realization of income cariiot be avoided by refusal
to claim the amount available. Corliss -. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930). In all cases,
however, the cash basis, like any other basis of reporting, must clearly reflect income.
See 1954 CODE § 446(b).
59. The usual accounting treatment is to accrue income only when there has been
a completed contract or sale and the amount in question has become an unequivocal asset
of the taxpayer. Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (195)) (holding that automobile dealers realized income as soon as finance companies credited amounts upon their
books because, at that time, the dealers acquired "fixed rights to receive the amounts"
so credited. The Court held that it was immaterial that the dealers, having guaranteed
or endorsed the commercial paper involved in the transactions, might never receive the
amounts because of their application by the finance company against a guarantee or
endorsement liability of a given dealer.)
60. Sarah L. Narischkine, 14 T.C. 1128 (1950) ; Estate of Fred Basch, 9 T.C. 627
(1947) ; Conner's Will, 75 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1948).
61. 1954 CODE § 691(a) (3).
62. 1954 CODE § 691(c).
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cedent's final return under the Enright rule." There is no longer any
reason to distinguish between ordinary claims to income, whether inchoate or legally matured, which a decedent had at the time of his death
and a decedent's contractual rights to have future income of a business
entity paid to his successors after his death. The death assignment concept would subject to income tax all amounts of a decedent's income received by his assignee without resorting to the legal fiction6 4 that the
63. The Enright rule was interpreted to require that the decedent must have died
owning at least a quantum ineruit claim before a bunching of income in the decedent's final return would be permitted. In the case of Randolph Peyton, 44 B.T.A. 1246 (1941),
the Board of Tax Appeals held that amounts paid to a decedent's estate by the former
partners of the decedent, which were based upon moral obligations having no basis in
quantum ineruit, were not subject to income tax in the decedent's final return. But the
income in respect of a decedent provision is not amenable to such a narrow construction.
In the important case of Bausch's Estate v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951),
for example, voluntary payments had been made by a decedent's former employer to the
decedent's estate. The Second Circuit held that the estate was taxable upon income in
respect of a decedent since the executors ". . in contemplation of law continued the
legal personalities of the employees who were specifically taxed under [1939 Code]
Section 126(a) upon receipts for services by their testators." Id. at 314.
64. This is not to indicate that legal fictions are not eminently useful and proper
methods of developing important legal principles. See, for example, FRANK, LAW AND
THE MODERN MIND 315 (1930) :
No doubt [Vaihinger's] . . . superficial acquaintance with law and lawyers
caused him to ignore lawyers' deficiencies. He seems to know little of the
continued use of so-called legal fictions as semi-myth to conceal the actualities
of legal change and adaptation-a misuse of fictions which indicates that liberated fictional thinking is not too evident, as yet, in law. Vaihinger has not
been apprised of that fiction phobia among lawyers of which Tourtoulon speaks.
To be sure, that phobia may be the first step in a health reaction against the
misuse of legal fictions, that is, against the use of fictions in law as semi-myth.
But such a reaction, when it leads to a war on legitimate fiction is a vice; the
cure for such fiction-phobia is to be found in the next step---the recognition by
the legal profession of the correct use of valid fiction and the acknowledgment
that all legal rules are relative and instrumental. What Vaihinger observes of
thinkers in other fields is no less true-is perhaps the more true-of lawyers:
a vast deal of their thought-devices involves conceptual distortion of the truth
without awareness of the distortion. Nominalism (the first step towards
knowledge of the provisional or relative character of all concepts) has made
but little headway in jurisprudence. Conceptualism may perhaps be said to
have its chief modern stronghold in the law. Many lawyers are still infected
with that scholasticism which converts abstractions into independent entities
having an "out-there" character. Vaihinger would doubtless be astonished to
discover how greatly the legal profession would be helped by assimilating the
following criticism which he makes of the naive use of "general ideas": . . .
general judgments when connected with a general subject, only represent convenient methods of expression. There is no such thing as a general subject in
reality. . . . As opposed to particulars, the [concepts or general ideas] have
been regarded as the permanent essence, and this permanent essence has been
hypostasized into an energetic thing interpreted as the general basis of particular
phenomena ...
Frank's great work is the best one on the subject and varieties of legal fictions. Such
fictions exist on many levels, of course, and indeed ". . . in a sense, all legal rules, principles, precepts, concepts, standards--allgeneralized statements of law--are fiction." Id.
at 167.
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assignee has in fact himself become a partner or business associate in the
business enterprise.
Perhaps the principal limitation of the death assignment cases which
have been decided without respect to a generic anticipatory assignment
principle springs from the failure to recognize that a decedent may effectually assign rights to receive income in a form other than a mere right
to collect amounts. The theory is that there is a basic, absolute distinction between "rights to income" and "rights to property." A decedent's
successor need do nothing himself in order for "rights to income" to
mature, so the courts have had no trouble in deciding that rights to receive renewal commissions, an employer's custom to pay bonuses, and all
rights to receive amounts on account of lifetime services by the decedent,
including those based on quantum meruit, nurture income in respect of a
decedent when the referent amounts are subsequently collected by the
decedent's successor in interest.6"
Unless a decedent's transferee acquires from te decedent a right to
collect such amounts, however, the transferee himself must take action to
convert his rights into income by sale or exchange. Those who would
import significance to that distinction in deciding death assignment cases
consider it one thing passively to pick fruit which is itself already classified as income but deem it fundamentally different for a recipient of
property rights in respect of a decedent to enter the market place and sell
or exchange them. The approach leads to illogical variances: (1) a
decedent's successor who sells accounts receivable not includable in the
decedent's final income tax return is in receipt of income in respect of a
decedent ;"O but (2) a decedent's successor who, after the decedent's death,
sells produce of a farm which was growing thereon at the time of the
decedent's death will not be subject to income taxation in respect of the
decedent"7 unless the decedent had delivered the produce to a marketing
65. Findlay v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1964) (renewal insurance
commissions); O'Daniel's Estate v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1949) (custom to pay bonuses); Davison's Estate v. United States, 292 F.2d 936 (Ct. Cl. 1961)
(quantum mcruit claim).
66. Dickson v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. Ky. 1950).
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b) (1957) states the folloving illustration:
Example (5). (1) A owned and operated an apple orchz rd. During his lifetime, A sold and delivered 1,000 bushels of apples to X a canning factory, but
did not receive payment before his death. A also entered into negotiations to
sell 3,000 bushels of apples to Y, a canning factory, but did not complete the
sale before his death. After A's death, the executor received payment from X.
He also completed the sale to Y and transferred to Y 1,200 bushels of apples on
hand at A's death and harvested and transferred an additional 1,800 bushels.
The gain from the sale of apples by A to X constitutes icome in respect of a
decedent when received. On the other hand, the gain from the sale of apples
by the executor to Y does not.
The Commissioner should not properly make such a concession, of course, especially in
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cooperative, or perhaps arranged for such delivery, before his death. 8
And to add insult to anamoly, a decedent's successor who sells inherited
farm produce for less than its fair market value at the time of the decedent's death would even be entitled to claim a loss chargeable against
his other income.
There is an elemental difference between original income earned by
a decedent's successor as a result of his own efforts and income received
from the sale of assets which the successor received by bequest, devise or
inheritance from a decedent; the distinction has been recognized as basic.
Before the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, an estate
was entitled to deduct in its income tax return amounts of current "income" which were "to be distributed currently" or amounts of such income "properly paid or credited" to legatees, heirs or beneficiaries."
light of the prior provision of his own regulations [Treas. Reg. § 1,691(a) -1(b) (3)
(1957) ] which would include within the term "income in respect of a decedent" any income ". . . to which the decedent had a contingent claim at the time of his death."
68. Commissioner v. Linde, 213 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1954). The Ninth Circuit reversed a decision of the Tax Court which had held that "income in respect of a decedent"
did not include amounts paid to a decedent's successor by a cooperative marketing association on account of grapes which had been turned over to the association for marketing
by the decedent before his death.
The Tax Court [Rose J. Linda, 17 T.C. 584 (1951)] had held for the taxpayer in
a puzzling decision. The decedent had been a grape farmer; at the time of his death
he had contributed his grape crop to various cooperatives in return for a pro rata share
of the proceeds after the pools had been "liquidated." The decedent died before liquidation, and the taxpayer was bequeathed the decedent's right in the unliquidated wine
pool. The pools were finally liquidated and the taxpayer received the proceeds. The
Commissioner argued that the proceeds constituted "income in respect of a decedent"
because they arose from "deferred purchase agreements" the decedent had made with
the cooperative. The Tax Court replied that there had been no sale, that the decedent
had retained an "equitable title" and the cooperative had become, in effect, a trustee.
Since there had been no "sale," the Tax Court reasoned that there had been no right
to income bequeathed to the taxpayer and the taxpayer's equitable interest was susceptible
to a basis increase at the time of the decedent's death.
In its reversing decision, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Tax Court's argument which
would have based the decision upon the existence or non-existence of a "sale":
We perceive no difference between what O'Daniel's employer did in paying
his estate the bonus, and what the cooperative did in paying respondent taxpayer the proceeds of the wine pool. After decedent had delivered his grapes
to the associations all he had remaining was a right to collect sums of money,
the amounts of which awaited the event of marketing. To say the expected
proceeds would be income in respect of the decedent if the transaction was a
sale, but not if it was a consignment, would be to apply an irrelevant test.
To make the decision turn on the label applied by the California courts to the
relationship of decedent to the cooperatives is to disregard the fact that we have
here a Federal law designed to deal with broad concepts of income. In terms
of realities there is no reason for distinguishing, tax-wise, between these particular contracts and others which the California courts might label otherwise.
Our problem is one of Federal law. In just as real a sense these proceeds
would have become income to the decedent had he lived to receive them, whether
they be called sales or something else...
213 F.2d at 7.
69. 1939 Code §§ 162(b), (c).
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The estate was not entitled to a deduction, however, where the income
realized by the estate arose from sales of assets left by a decedent.70 Significant to our generic anticipatory assignment principle would be the
judicial comprehension of the fact that a decedent himself had had sufficiently greater contacts leading to income arising from the sale of his
assets by an executor or administrator than did the executor or administrator himself.
Maximum beneficial contacts of a decedent with subsequently
realized proceeds of sale of his assets exist in those cases where the decedent leaves the assets subject to a non-personal contract71 for sale.
Since property in the goods still remains in the decedent at his death, no
traditional "right to income" replaces the property itself in the decedent's
estate. To hold that such a difference influences subsequent income
taxation of amounts received by a decedent's successor, however, would
be superficial. It was the decedent's efforts and the decedent's contract
of sale which gave rise to the subsequent income 2 no less than if the
property in the goods had been transferred to the vendee before the decedent's death. Aside from the intricacies involved in determining the
70. Dunlop v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1948); Burchenal v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1945); It re Rogers' Estate, 143 F.2d 695 (2d Cir.
1944).
71. A contract which has its object personal services by the decedent would be
discharged upon his death. 2 W LISTON, CONTRAcTS § 411 (1936).
72. See, for example, Bausch's Estate v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir.
1951). Following the deaths of two employees, a corporation, acting in accordance with
past custom, voluntarily paid the estate of each of the two cecedents the amount of
$1500 per month for a period of twelve months following deah. The Second Circuit
held that the amounts constituted taxable income to the executcrs and were not "gifts"
since the real question was whether the amounts paid were attributable to the decedents'
lifetime efforts:
The fact that [the payments] . . . were voluntary and could not have been

enforced by action did not necessarily render them gifts within the meaning of
[the statute]. .

.

. Here . . . it had become a practice of the Company to

recompense the estates or dependents of deceased founders. Payments were
measured by the salary paid each decedent during the year prior to his death;
from such undisputed facts, there would seem to be a reasonable inference
that the payments were a reward for past services, and so the determination
of the Tax Court should be upheld.
Id. at 314. See also, the dissenting opinion written by Mr. Justice Cardozo in the case of
Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34 (1937). The majority there had held that payments voluntarily made by a corporation to former employees constituted gifts albeit the
facts clearly indicated the payments were made because of faithful past services. The
dissenters challenged the majority's theory that the case was to be decided in terms of
the "voluntary" nature of the payments:
What controls is not the presence or absence of consider.tion. What controls
is the intention with which payments, however voluntar;, have been made.
Had it been made with the intention that services rendered in the past shall be
requited more completely, though full acquittance has teen given? If so,
it bears a tax.
Id. at 45.
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difference between a sale and a contract of sale, 3 one of the most immutable principles of income tax law rejects the relevancy of technicalities of title."4
Must a decedent's assets received by his successor have been subject
to a contract of sale before amounts received by the successor upon a
subsequent sale will constitute income in respect of a decedent? The
argument for the affirmative would be that without a contract of sale a
decedent would not have died owning a "title" to a right to receive income in due course.7 ' But such a proposition advances the same old
warmed-over theory of the relevancy of "title," a test which courts have
repeatedly rejected. The want of a "title" to a right to receive amounts
from a sale, a mere formalism, is no reason not to impute sales proceeds
of a particular sale to a former owner of the property sold. Whether or
not there should be such an imputation to a decedent as the former owner
of the "property" sold by his successor demands a factual, not a legal,
resolution. Perhaps the inquiry should be, in all cases, whether a decedent's pre-death contacts with the subsequently maturing income items
were of sufficient quality and quantity to make it fair to subject the successor to tax upon income in respect of a decedent.
Total attainment or even partial fulfillment of a cogent death assignment concept predictively will gore many a favorite ox. But the
courts should not be deterred from fully effectuating the proper result by
the emotional approach that there is something magical taxwise in a decedent's death which compels that his transferee receive a new date-ofdeath basis in "property" rights which are received by bequest, devise or
inheritance. It is beyond dispute that if the income in respect of a de73. Assume, for example, that a decedent had contracted with his business partners
for them to purchase his partnership interest at death; would that be a sale or a contract
to sell? There is disagreement. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 6 (1948).
74. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930); Linde v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 1
(9th Cir. 1951).
75. This argument enjoyed a brief period of success, typified by the Tax Court decision in Rose J. Linde, 17 T.C. 584 (1951), a decision which was later reversed, and
properly so, by the Ninth Circuit (see note 66 supra). The Tax Court's naive enchantment with technicalities of title was evidenced by such remarks as:
The only logical explanation for the use of the terminology that the "member
sells and the association buys" grapes is that these were terms conveying the
legal title to the association while the members at all times retained an equitable property interest in the grapes or the wine in the pool pro rated to the
grapes they had delivered. . . . Accordingly, we reject Respondent's contention that the proceeds received by the Petitioner from the association consisted
of deferred purchase payments for grapes which decedent had sold them. . . .
Since sales were not made during decedent's lifetime, there could be no distributable proceeds due him when he died. Accordingly, no right to income
from this source arose during decedent's lifetime.

Id. at 593-94.
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cedent provision applies, the date-of-death basis section does not;"0 and
there is indeed support in the legislative history itself for the conclusion
that the major purpose of the entire death assignment concept was to
purge the inequities of the date-of-death basis provisions."
A statutory writ legitimately aids and abets a plenary development
of the concept of death assignments of income, but when we turn to sale
assignments of income we have no felt need for legislative patronage. We
enter full upon a common law development of federal income taxation.
V.
The income tax problem posed by a sale assignment of income is to
determine whether amounts received by a seller of "property" are to be
characterized as ordinary income, because of being an anticipatory assignment of income, or should be attributed to a sale or other disposition
7
of property other than a right to receive incomeY.
In the Hort case," the
taxpayer had inherited land and a ten story offica building from his
father in 1928. The land and building were subject to a lease, but five
years after his father's death the taxpayer received $140,000 from the
lessee in consideration for the cancellation of the lease. The taxpayer
argued that since the real estate he had received by bequest was subject to
76. United States v. Ellis, 264 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Senate Report No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess., 1942-2 C.B. 580:
Since this Section provides for the treatment of such amounts as income to
the persons placed in the same position as the decedent with respect to such
amounts, the provisions of [1939 Code] Section 113 (a) (5) with respect to the
basis of property do not apply to these amounts in their hands.
and Treas. Regs. § 1.691(a)-3(a) (1957):
[T]he provisions of Section 1014(a), relating to the b.-sis of property acquired from a decedent, do not apply to these amounts in the hands of the
estate and such persons.
And of course 1954 CODE § 1014 itself states:
(c) Property Representing Income in Respect of a Dec-Aent.-This Section
shall not apply to property which constitutes a right to receive an item of
income in respect of a decedent under Section 691.
77. Randolph Paul, the then tax advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury, made
two recommendations to the House Ways and Means Committee concerning the Revenue
Act of 1942 amendments: (1) he recommended that relief be given in the area where
[1939 Code] § 42 caused income to be bunched in a decedent's inal return; (2) he also
urged that the inequities caused by [1939 Code] § 113(a) (5) b! removed:
A large part of the capital gains inherent in the increased value of property
thus escapes income tax as the assets are handed down rom one generation
to the other.
Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of x942. 77th
Cong. 2d Sess. 89 (1942).
78. That is, whether a given case is to be determined by 1954 CODE § 61 ("Gross
Income Defined") or by the interaction of 1954 CODE §§ 1001 ("Determination of
Amount of and Recognition of Gain or Loss"), 1002 ("Recognition of Gain or Loss"),
1011 ("Adjusted Basis for Determining Gain or Loss"), 1202 ("Deduction for Capital
Gains"), and 1221-23 ("General Rules for Determining Capital Gains and Losses").
79. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1940).
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the lease at the date of his father's death, the lease itself constituted
"property" so that the amount he received upon its cancellation was simply
a return of capital, not income. Mr. Justice Murphy, writing for a
unanimous court, disagreed:
The consideration received for cancellation of the lease was not
a return of capital. We assume that the lease was "property"
whatever that signifies abstractly. Presumably the bond in
. . .Horst . . .and the lease in . . .Bruun . . .were also

"property" but the interest coupon in Horst and the building in
Bruun nevertheless were held to constitute items of gross income. Simply because the lease was "property," the amount received for its cancellation was not a return of capital, quite
apart from the fact that "property" and "capital" are not necessarily synonymous in the Revenue Act .
80
usage.

.

. or in common

The Court went on to point out that the cancellation of the lease "involved nothing more than the relinquishment of the right to future rental
payments in return for a present substituted payment and possession of
the leased premises." The case is good authority for the proposition that
a right to receive an amount, even though it is "property," which would
constitute income when received is not a capital asset; and any amounts
attributable to a transfer by sale of that right before the amounts are
received will constitute an anticipatory assignment of income, hence
ordinary income.
Those who would advert importance to the fact that a given sale
assignment of income is accompanied by a concomitant sale of a "source"
of the income would distinguish the Hort case as involving no simultaneous transfer of the source, that is, the apartment building itself. The
Watson case81 is a good answer to such critics. There the taxpayer had
reported the sale of orange trees which included green oranges growing
thereon as giving rise to gain from the sale of a capital asset. Rather
than approaching the case as one involving an anticipatory assignment of
income, however, the Supreme Court followed the taxpayer's reasoning
and chose to decide whether the amounts received attributable to the green
oranges arose from the sale of "property used in a trade or business,"
gain from which would qualify for capital gain treatment. Excluded
from the category of property so used was "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade
80. Id. at 31.
81. Watson v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 544 (1952).
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or business." The Supreme Court held that the proceeds fairly attributable to the sale of the green oranges were from property so held and
therefore constituted an exception to the statutory rule allowing for
capital gain treatment."
If the Supreme Court had chosen to decide Watson within the figuration of an anticipatory assignment of income rathrer than as a controversy requiring only a definition of "capital asset" it would have evaded
the logical and forceful dissenting opinion which was well documented by
the legislative history of the capital asset provision.'- The Hort case had
established that a right to receive income is not a capital asset, and the
majority easily could have based its decision upon a natural extension of
that concept. Because of this limitation, Watson gave apparent encouragement to those who would convert business income into capital gain
through the simple expedient of selling a "capital asset." The theory was
that the vision of Hort had been largely undone by Watson; but the next
Supreme Court expression on the subject invigorated the anticipatory
assignment idea in business situations.
The Corn Products decisions4 held that the sale of corn futures did
not qualify for capital gain treatment. Because of adverse business experiences in 1934 and again in 1936 attributable to droughts in the cornbelt which caused a sharp increase in the price of spot corn, Corn Products
Refining Company had established a long position in corn futures "as a
part of its corn-buying program" and "as the most economical method
of obtaining an adequate supply of raw corn." Corn Products realized
substantial profit from the sale of corn futures which it argued necessarily constituted capital gain income; both the Tax Court"2 and the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"6 found that the taxpayer's fu82. The Court in Watsoa found it unnecessary to consider the alternative argument
by the Commissioner that the taxpayer had not held the oraonges themselves for over
sLx months, hence would not have been entitled to long term cmpital gain treatment upon
the proceeds attributable to the sale of the oranges even if they had been characterized
as "capital assets."
83. Mr. Justice Minton, joined by Justices Reed and Douglas, dissented in Watson
and noted: "Congress took cognizance of the construction . . . by the Commissioner
and the Tax Court, and amended the section to make it abundantly clear that unharvested crops were a part of the realty upon which they were growing and were to be
given capital gains treatment.... ." 345 U.S. at 553. Le,-slative history supports
this argument insofar as it interpreted growing crops as constituting a part of real estate.
84. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
85. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 395 (1951).
86. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1954).
The Second Circuit limited the scope of its opinion by tying it to the permitted scope
of definitions of "capital assets." In part, the court stated:
Where futures are dealt with for the purposes of speculation or what is called
legitimate capital transactions, they obviously fall outskie the possibly relex-ant exclusions of Section 117(a). In a hedge, however, the property is used
in such a manner as to come within the exclusions, for it is a part of the in-
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ture transactions were integral parts of its business designed to protect
manufacturing operations against a price increase in the principal raw
material and to assure a ready supply for future manufacturing requirements, hence nurtured ordinary income. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed both lower courts and rejected the taxpayer's notion
that a literal reading of the capital asset provision was ever proper in cases
concerning sale assignments of income:
Admittedly, Petitioner's corn futures do not come within the
literal language of the [capital asset definition provisions] . . .
But the capital asset provision . . . must not be so broadly ap-

plied as to defeat rather than further the purpose of Congress.
. . . Congress intended that profits and losses arising from

the everyday operations of a business be considered as ordinary
income. . .. The preferential treatment [given capital gains]
. . . applies to transactions and property which are not the

normal source of business income ...

"

Probably the most significant contribution of the Corn Products case to
the generic anticipatory assignment principle is the concept that we do not
even reach the capital gains provisions if the amounts realized upon a
sale, albeit a sale of "property," are substitutes for a "normal source of
business income.""8
Notwithstanding the "normal source of business income" language
of Corn Products, however, the fact of the matter is that the Supreme
Court had yet to take a firm position that it need not even be concerned
with technicalities of definitions in cases involving sale assignments of
ventory purchase system which is utilized solely for the purpose of stabilizing
inventory cost. It is an integral part of the productive process in which the
property is held not for investment but for the protection of profit with the
intent of disposition when that purchase has been achieved.
The futures transactions of this Petitioner, it is true, did not constitute what is
known as "true" hedging. But this is a distinction presently of no significance.
The property here was used for essentially the same purpose and in the same
manner as in true hedging. Futures contracts were entered into to stabilize
inventory costs and thus protect profit, and whether complete or only partial insurance was thereby obtained is simply a difference in degree, not in kind.
Therefore, for the same reasons that the true hedge is not accorded capital
treatment . .. , the kind of transactions with which we are now concerned,
are not to be regarded as capital ones either.
215 F.2d at 516.

87. 350 U.S. at 51-52.
88. The query as to whether amounts which would have been received in the future, absent a sale assignment, would have represented a "normal source of business
income" properly emphasizes the volitional element in capital gains taxation. Necessarily a taxpayer who assigns away his right to receive "normal business income' in
due course is turning his back on such income (cf., the constructive receipt cases), something he should not be allowed to do with tax impunity.
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income; but it was only three years before that the Court had before it a
suitable vehicle for doing just that. The P. G. Lake decision 8 was based
firmly upon the sale assignment of income theory. The question was
whether taxpayers who received amounts for the transfer of mineral payment rights carved out from larger mineral interests were entitled to capital gain treatment.9" The court admitted that rights to receive mineral
payments were interests in land but rejected the argument that it was
necessary to determine whether or not such interests were "capital assets." The equivocating theories of Watson and Corn Products were
discarded, the Court concluding quite simply that the taxpayers had
clearly attempted anticipatory assignments of income, hence realized
ordinary income upon the sale of the mineral payment rights.9 '
The normal business income theory of Corn Products was sharpened
considerably when the Supreme Court decided the Gillette Motor case 2
where a taxpayer had received $100,000 as compensation for a "taking"
by the government of its business during World War II. In point of
89. Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (19.8).
90. The difficulty inherent in the "source" approach to anticipatory assignment
questions is well evident in the mineral cases. In Clampitt v. Ponder, 91 F. Supp. 535
(W.D. Ark. 1950), the court held that the reservation in a warranty deed of one-half
royalty of all minerals described in a deed was ambiguous ard that under the circumstances the grantors were entitled to a perpetual royalty interest rather than to a mineral
fee. The court stated that the ". . . mere use of the word 'royalty' in a reservation
does not of itself compel the conclusion that only leases then in existence are included. . . ." Id. at 541.
Standard Oil Co. v. Marshall, 265 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1959), held that owners of oil
payment rights had only non-possessory incorporeal interests in land, and hence were
not necessary parties plaintiff in a suit of trespass to try title. The court discussed the
nature of the problem (at p. 53) :
[Those cases] have settled the law in Texas that an oil payment is not a conveyance of oil in place, not a promise to pay money, not a contract for sale of
oil after production, but an incorporeal hereditament in te nature of an overriding royalty creating a present interest in land in the pa ee.
An oil payment is like an overriding royalty. It is carv,-d out of the lessee's
share of the oil, the working interest, as distinguishcd from the lessor's
royalty interest. It differs from an overriding royalty only in that it is of
limited duration; it expires when the payee receives a fixed amount for his
interest.
91. Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1958):
[C]ash was received which was equal to the amount of the income to accrue during the term of the assignment, the assignee being compcnsated by interest on
his advance. The substance of what was assigned was th. right to receive future income. The substance of what was received was thu present value of income which the recipient would otherwise obtain in the future. In short,
consideration was paid for the right to receive future income, not for an increase in the value of the income-producing property. . . . [W]e have held
that if one, entitled to receive at a future date interest on a bond or compensation for services, makes a grant of it by anticipatory assignment, he realizes
taxable income as if he had collected the interest or received the salary and
then paid it over. That is the teaching of . . . Horst . . . and Schaffner . . .
and it is applicable here.
92. Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transport, Inc., 364 U.S. 130 (1960).
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fact, the taxpayer had continued to direct the operation of the business
subject only to certain orders given by the "Federal Manager" from time
to time. The Court rejected the taxpayer's idea that the taxpayer had
received compensation for the taking of a "capital asset"; but probably
more important was yet another permutation of the sale assignment principle expressed by the Court:
[T]he right [of the taxpayer to use its transportation facility
as it saw fit] is manifestly not of the type which gives rise to
the hardship of the realization in one year of an advance in
value over costs built up in several years, which is what Congress sought to ameliorate by the capital-gains provisions.
In short, the right to use is not a capital asset, but is simply an
incident of the underlying physical property, the recompense
for which is commonly regarded as rent. . .

."

Not much imagination would be required to interpret the Gillette Motor
case as supporting the proposition that a right to use business assets is an
incident of them with the obvious result that a sale of business assets with
a retention by the seller of a right to use them would constitute an anticipatory assignment of income even when measured by the traditional treefruit metaphor.
Unhappily for the integrity of our Federal income tax system, however, the next principal sale assignment case decided by the Supreme
Court superficially (but not actually) represented a substantial retrogression in the conceptualistic treatment of sale assignments of income.
In Clay Brown,9 4 the Supreme Court held that the sale of all of the stock
of a closely held business corporation gave rise to capital gain even
though the selling shareholder retained control of the operation of the
business and the selling price was to be paid solely out of the profits of
the business. Admittedly the case had within it distractive elements of
tax avoidance (the "sale" was to a charity with the result that the subsequent business earnings would not contribute their fair share of income
taxes to the economy), but the most recedent part of the decision was the
Supreme Court's apparent enchantment with the naive, formulistic
methods of analysis which preceded such cases as P. G. Lake and Gillette
Motor.
A civilized amount of charity demands some moderation of criticism
of the Supreme Court for its decision in Clay Brown because the Commissioner himself injected an almost unbelievable amount of confusion
93. Id. at 135.
94. Commissioner v. Clay B. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
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into the case. For one reason or another, he refused to present the case
to the Supreme Court as one concerning a clear and apparent sale assignment of income. Rather than seeking confirmation of the obvious irrelevancy of such attenuated subtleties as "source of income" and "capital assets" in sale assignment cases, the Government lawyers pursued a
blind, almost mystical course in urging the Supreme Court to decide the
case in terms of whether or not a "sale" had really taken place.9" We
can hardly blame the Supreme Court for accepting the invitation:
To say that there is no sale because there is no risk-shifting
because the price to be paid is payable only from the income
produced by the business sold, is very little different from saying that because business earnings are usually taxable as ordinary income, they are subject to the same tax when paid over
as the purchase price of property. This argument has rationality but it places an unwarranted construction on the term
"sale," is contrary to the policy of the capital gains provisions
S. .,and has no support in the cases. We reject it."
Since the question of whether or not there had been a sale assignment of
income was neither raised nor decided in Clay Brozo'wn, that case does not
overrule, limit or even modify the holdings in such cases as Hort, Watson, Corn. Products,P. G. Lake, and Gillette Motor. All that the Clay
Brown case really decided was that there can be a "sale" for tax purposes
even though a seller is to pay the purchase price from the earnings of the
95. In its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari filed in Clay Brown, the attorneys for
the Commissioner explained to the Supreme Court the "Re-isons For Granting The
Writ":
This is a tax case of rare importance. Its importance lkis both in the fundamental character of the question of statutory interpretation involved-what
constitutes a "sale" for purposes of the capital gains piovisions-and in the
social, economic and revenue implications of the part:cular transaction in
issue--'bootstrap" sales of businesses to' charities.
Id. at 7. And in the Brief for the Petitioner, the Government lawyers defined the
"Question Presented":
Whether a transfer of stock in which the transferor receixes nothing but (1) a
right to have remitted to him, until he has received a stated amount, whatever
income accrues to the transferee from the ownership of the stock (or the
underlying corporate assets), and (2) a right to recovtr the stock (or the
assets) if the stated amount has not been remitted by a prescribed date, is a
"sale" of the stock . . . entitling the transferor to report the income thereafter
remitted to him only as long-term capital gain, or is a ransfer of the stock
with a retained income interest, making the remitted ir come taxable to the
transferor as ordinary income.
Id. at 2. It is surprising, indeed shocking, that normally sophi ;ticated lawyers would all
but concede a case by themselves urging that a decision not only be based upon the "attenuated subtlety" of "sale" but also that if a "sale" occurrd capital gain treatment
necessarily results, a truly amazing concession.

96 380 U.S. at 570.
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property sold; the Court did not even reach the question which had not
been presented of whether there had been a sale assignment of income
because of the Government's strange concession that, given a "sale," the
taxpayer qualified for capital gains treatment.
The Supreme Court partially redeemed itself from its Clay Brown
misadventure with its decision in Midland-Ross," a case which closely
followed (chronologically) the Clay Brown case. A unanimous Supreme
Court held in the latter case that amounts received upon a sale of a noninterest-bearing promissory note which had been purchased at a discount,
to the extent they were attributable to earned original issue discount, were
not eligible for capital gains treatment. The Commissioner had the good
sense not to lead the Supreme Court down the primrose "sale" path again
so the case was correctly analyzed in sale assignment terms.
Hopefully, it may be predicted that more and more of the sale assignment of income cases will reject analysis in terms of a proper definition of "capital assets" or "sale" and will instead pursue the question of
whether taxpayers ".

.

.

can convert what would in time constitute

ordinary income . . .into capital gain.""8 The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, for example, holding that the portion of consideration received upon the sale of rights and interest in a partnership business which
were attributable to the transfer of a management contract gave rise to
ordinary income, used language which correlated closely with that usually
reserved by courts for the traditional gift assignment cases.9" We may
97. United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54 (1965).
98. Arnfeld v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 865, 869 (Ct. Cl. 1958). The Court
of Claims held that gains realized by a taxpayer from the sale of an annuity policy to
a third person before its maturity were taxable as ordinary income, not as capital gain.
The court cited with approval the cases of Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d 590 (2d Cir.
1937) (taxing as ordinary income amounts received by a partner upon a "sale" of his
interest in -billed and unbilled fees of the partnership to the remaining partners) ; Rhodes'
Estate v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1942) (classifying as ordinary income
amounts received by a taxpayer upon a "sale" of a right to receive dividends which had
already been declared upon stock owned by the taxpayer) ; and Fisher v. Commissioner,
209 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1954) (holding that amounts received upon the sale of corporate
notes which were then in default both as to principal and interest were taxable as ordinary income).
99. United States v. Woolsey, 326 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1963). The court stated in
part:
Intricate and complicated problems are presented in applying the recognized
rules to the facts in each case. Fundamental to a proper decision in each case,
and to the application of well-recognized rules, is a determination of the type
and nature of the underlying right or property assigned or transferred. It is
always pertinent to inquire how the proceeds to be received would have been
taxable if there had been no assignment of the contract. Close scrutiny is required if the consideration received is actually a present substitute for what
would have been ordinary earned income in the hands of the assigning taxpayer,
if the assignment or transfer had not been made. A mere "sale or exchange"
does not convert a right to earn income in the future which would be taxable
as ordinary income to the taxpayer, into a capital gain.'...
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hope for a plenary development of the sales assignment principle, but one
thing is certain: the courts must never recede by restoring any semblance
of the concept that the sale assignment principle will not apply if the
"source" of income is sold by a taxpayer along with the subsumed rights
to receive income from that source in the future.
VI.
The purpose of the sixteenth amendment was to eliminate the
source of income as a relevant factor in the taxing of income."' 0 Before
The existence of a partnership does not result in the crcation of a sovereign
alchemist that can transmute ordinary income into a capital asset. When we
look at the underlying right assigned in this case, we cannot escape the conclusion that so much of the consideration which relates to the right to earn ordinary income in the future under the "management contract," taxable to the
assignee as ordinary income, is likewise taxable to the assignor as ordinary
income although such income must be earned. . . . It i3 our conclusion that
such portion of the consideration received by the taxpayers in this case as
property should be allocated to the present value of the right to earn ordinary
income in the future under the "management contract" is subject to taxation as
ordinary income.
Id. at 291.
100. Brushaber v. Union Pacific, 240 U.S. 1 (1916) upheld the income tax provision of the Tariff Act of 1913. Mr. Chief Justice White observed that it was only
the unity of the statutory scheme which caused the tax on earned incomes (i.e., incomes
from "business, privileges, and employment") to fall in the Pollock case [158 U.S. 601
(1895)] then continued:
[T]he whole purpose of the Amendment was to relieve al income taxes when
imposed from apportionment from a consideration of the source whence the
income was derived. Indeed in the light of the history which we have given and
of the decision in the Pollock case and the ground upon which the ruling in
that case was based, there is no escape from the conclusion that the Amendment
was drawn for the purpose of doing away for the future x ith the principle upon
which the Pollock case was decided, that is, of determiniag whether a tax on
income was direct not by a consideration of the burden placed on the taxed income upon which it directly operated, but by taking into view the burden which
resulted on the property from which the income was derived. .

.

. The con-

tention that the Amendment treats a tax on income as a direct tax . . . and is
necessarily therefore not subject to the rule of uniformity . . . is also clearly
without foundation since the command of the Amendment that all income taxes
shall not be subject to apportionment by a consideration of the sources from
which the taxed income may be derived, forbids the applic-ation to such taxes of
the rule applied in the Pollock case by which alone such taxes were removed
from the great class of excises, duties and imposts subject to the rule of uniformity and were placed under the other or direct class. This must be unless it
can be said that although the Constitution as a result of the Amendment in
express terms excludes the criterion of source of income that criterion yet remains for the purpose of destroying the classifications of the Constitution by
taking an excise out of the class to which it belongs and transferring it to a
class in which it cannot be placed, consistently with the requirements of the
Constitution. . . . The purpose was not to change the cexisting interpretation
except to the extent necessary to accomplish the result intended, that is, the
prevention of the resort to the sources from which a taxcd income was derived
in order to cause a direct tax on the income to be a direct tax on the source
itself and thereby to take an income tax out of the class of excises, duties and
imposts and place it in the class of direct taxes.
240 U.S. at 13-19.
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adoption of the sixteenth amendment 1 ' which authorized an unapportioned tax on "incomes," the Pollock case 0 2 held that if a tax on an
income-source (such as real estate or personal property) would be a direct
tax, a tax on income from that source would also constitute a direct tax
within the meaning of the Constitution and would therefore demand apportionment for its validity.'
After the sixteenth amendment, the
definitive case of Eisner v. Macomber'0 then affirmed the proposition
that an income tax cannot validly be assessed against the source of in101. On February 25, 1913, the United States Secretary of State proclaimed that
the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States had been properly
ratified. The amendment is succinct:
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes upon incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration.
102. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
103. The sixteenth amendment was enacted to evade the holding of the Pollock
case. An 1894 act of Congress had imposed a tax of 2% upon the net income of corporations. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). Mr. Chief
Justice Fuller, writing for the Court, pointed out that an excise tax limited to income
itself would be indirect and therefore require no apportionment, but then held the particular tax statute unconstitutional:
Whatever the speculative views of political economists or revenue reformers
may be, can it be properly held that the Constitution, taken in its plain and obvious sense, and with due regard to the circumstances attending the formation
of the government, authorizes a general unapportioned tax on the products of
the farm and the rents of real estate, although imposed merely because of
ownership and with no possible means of escape from payment, as belonging
to a totally different class from that which includes the property from whence
the income proceeds?
There can be but one answer, unless the Constitutional restriction is to be
treated as utterly illusory and futile, and the object of the framers defeated.
We find it impossible to hold that a fundamental requisition, deemed so important as to be enforced by two provisions, one affirmative and one negative,
can be refined away by forced distinctions between that which gives value to
the property, and the property itself.
The stress of the argument is thrown, however, on the assertion that an income
tax is not a property tax at all; that it is not a real estate tax, or a crop tax,
or a bond tax; that it is an assessment upon the taxpayer on account of his
money-spending power as shown by his revenue for the year preceding the
assessment; that rents received, crops harvested, interest collected, have lost all
connections with their origin, and although once not taxable have become
transmuted in their new form into taxable subject-matters; in other words,
that income is taxable irrespective of the source from whence it is derived.
Admitting that this act taxes the income of property irrespective of its source,
still we cannot doubt that such a tax is necessarily a direct tax in the meaning
of the Constitution.
Id. at 627-30. The Court concluded by remarking that since there was only one scheme
of taxation involved, the entire statute, even including those sections taxing income from
"businesses, privileges or employment" which would by themselves have been indirect,
was invalid.
104. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Holmes wrote:
"The known purpose of this Amendment was to get rid of nice questions as to what
might be direct taxes. . . ." Id. at 220. Contrary to Mr. Justice Holmes' immoderate
judgment, the purpose of the sixteenth amendment was not to eliminate the distinctions
between direct and indirect taxes but was rather to say that taxes on "incomes" are
proper without regard to their characterization as either direct or indirect.
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come itself unless it is apportioned; and it was quickly decided, without
significant comment, that a taxpayer need not own the source of income
to be taxed upon it. Indeed, except for Holmes' tree-fruit metaphor, the
Supreme Court has constantly recognized over the years that the determination of the proper person to be taxed is not limited by ownership or
even control of the source itself.
Mr. Justice Holmes himself once expressed the proposition that it is
the use of a particular source for the benefit of the recipient of amounts
from it, rather than its ownership, which is the significant factor in identifying the proper taxpayer. Before the establishment of the special
statutory trust provisions imposing income taxes directly against a trust
beneficiary, the Supreme Court once faced the question whether under
the general income provisions of the Code an income beneficiary for a
period of years with no interest in the corpus of the trust fund was in
receipt of "income." In Irwin v. Gavit,'" Mr. Justice Holmes wrote the
Court's affirmative answer:
The courts below went on the ground that the gift to the plaintiff was a bequest and carried no interest in the corpus of the
fund. We do not regard those considerations as conclusive, as
we have said, but if it were material, a gift of the income of a
fund ordinarily is treated by equity as creating an interest in
the fund. Apart from technicalities we can perceive no distinction relevant to the question before us between a gift of the
fund for life and a gift of the income from it. The fund is appropriated to the production of the same result whichever form
the gift takes. Neither are we troubled by the question where to
draw the line. That is the question in pretty rauch everything
worth arguing in the law. .

.

. It seems to us immaterial the

same amounts might receive a different color from their
00
source1
The Gavit case preceded by five years Mr. Justice Holmes' tree-fruit
metaphor by which he ignored his own admonition by drawing an illusive
"line" between income and source.
Notwithstanding the metaphor, down through the years the Supreme
Court has continued to affirm the irrelevancy of source. The 1933 case
of Reiwcke v. Smith,' for example, expressed the concept that it is the
right to receive income by control of the source of it rather than technical
105. 268 U.S. 161 (1925).
106. Id. at 167-68.
107. 289 U.S. 172 (1933)
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concepts of ownership of the source which is important. In holding that
the grantor of a trust was properly taxed upon its income where he and a
non-adverse party had a power during the taxable year to revest in the
grantor title to the corpus, the Supreme Court indicated that it was because the source was controlled that the grantor could have received the
income had he chosen to do so:
A settlor who at every moment retains the power to repossess
the corpus and enjoy the income has such a measure of control
as justifies the imposition of a tax upon him. .

.

. As declared

by the Committee reporting the section in question, a revocable
trust amounts . . . to no more than an assignment of income.... It cannot therefore be successfully urged that as the le-

gal title is held by the trustee the income necessarily must for income taxation be deemed to accrue from property of someone
other than . . . [the grantor]. .

. The measure of control

.

of corpus and income retained by the grantor was sufficient to
justify the attribution of the income of the trust to him." 8
Even in its present imperfect state, the anticipatory assignment principle does not require that a taxpayer who voluntarily transfers ownership of a source of income must retain at least a reversionary interest in
it before he may be taxed upon future income from the source. If the
assignor has dedicated the future income from the source to a satisfaction of his legal obligations, for example, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes'
opinion in Douglas v. Willcuts,0 9 aids identification of the proper taxpayer:
No question is raised as to the constitutional power of the Congress to attribute to Petitioner the amount thus segregated and
paid in discharge of his obligations, and that authority could
not be challenged successfully. .

.

. We have held that income

was received by a taxpayer, when, pursuant to a contract, a
debt or other obligation was discharged by another for his benefit. The transaction was regarded as being the same in substance as if the money had been paid to the taxpayer and he
had transmitted it to his creditor. .

.

. The creation of a trust

by the taxpayer as the channel for the application of the income
to the discharge of his obligation leaves the nature of the transaction unaltered."'
108. Id. at 177-78.
109 296 U.S. 1 (1935).
110. Id. at 9.
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Since the entire concept of "income" is evolutionary and expansive in nature, however, the real importance of Douglas v. Wi !cuts is not its particular holding at all. Hughes announced that the question of whether future income should be taxed to a one-time owner of the "source" which
produces it is a question which arises under the general provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code defining "income" rather than under any particular sections:
We do not regard the provisions of the statutes as to the taxation of trusts, fiduciaries and beneficiaries . . . as intended to
apply to cases where the income of the trust would otherwise
remain, by virtue of the nature and purpose of the trust, attributable to the creator . . . and accordingly taxable to
him. . . . [W]e find no warrant for a construction which
would preclude the laying of the tax against the one who . . .
enjoys the benefit of the income as though he had personally
received it."'
And a one-time owner of a source of income may continue to be taxed on
income from it unless he can show by "clear and convincing proof that
application of amounts from the source does not constitute income" to
2
him.1
One reason why the source of income is not significant in determining income tax consequences is that ". . . the determination . . . of
what is income and to whom it is attributable . . .has but an economic
1 13
significance, and so . . . is properly a matter of economic analysis."
Indeed, it is unnecessary to identify any source at all in deciding whether
one is to be charged with taxable income. In the Glenshaw Glass case," 4
the Supreme Court held that money received as exemplary damages for
fraud or as the punitive two-thirds portion of a treble damage anti-trust
recovery ". . . had to be included in 'gross income' within the general
income concepts of the Internal Revenue Code." The Court expressly rejected the taxpayer's theory of the relevancy of a "source" and underscored the importance of the benefit concept of "income":
Respondents contend that punitive damages, characterized as
"windfalls" . . . are not within the scope of the section. But
Congress applied no limitation as to the source of taxable receipts, nor restrictive labels as to their nature. And the Court
111. Id. at 9-10.
112. Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U.S. 80 (1940).
113. Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring in Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S.

733, 750 (1949).
114. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
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has given a liberal construction to this broad phraseology in
recognition of the intention of Congress to tax all gains except
those specifically exempted.
Nor can we accept Respondents' contention that a narrower
reading of Sec. 22(a) [of the 1939 Code] is required by the
Court's characterization of income in Eisner v. Macomber, . . .
as "the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined." . . . In that context-distinguishing gain from capi-

tal-the definition served a useful purpose. But it was not
meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income
questions." 5
And by rejecting once and for all consideration of the source of particular income as a factor of relevancy, we are able to identify an income
tax as being nothing more or less than an excise tax upon incomes.'
VII.
Like all excise taxes, an income tax is to be "cut from" the thing
taxed, i.e., the income itself. Since a person is a proper taxpayer only if
he at least had it within his power to enjoy the actual benefit for which
the tax is to be paid, in most cases the appropriate inquiry is elemental:
who is the "owner" of the income?".. The bisector of the line to be
115. Id. at 429-31.
116. Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916). The taxpayer there
urged that because of the failure of the 1913 act to allow for depletion of natural resources, the income tax as applied to mines was really a tax on property because of its
ownership and hence not protected by the sixteenth amendment. In holding for the
Government, Mr. Chief Justice White remarked quite simply that the income tax was
not a direct tax at all but was rather "a true excise levied on the results of the business
of carrying on mining operations."
117. Hughes v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1946). The Commissioner
had included in a husband's income dividends which had been paid to his wife upon
stock owned by her. The only explanation of the adjustment which the Commissioner
made was ".

.

. that dividends . . . on . . . stock . . . are taxable to you rather than

to your wife. [1939 Code] § 22(a).. . ." The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
noting quite simply that a married woman had a right to own property individually,
decided against the Commissioner. In so doing, the court adverted to the stated
grounds for the Commissioner's action:
The Commissioner gives no reason why the dividend was not hers save to refer
to . . . Section 22(a). That Section includes in taxable income "dividends."
Dividends are of course taxable. The Section, like the Constitutional Amendment permitting the taxation (without apportionment) of "incomes, from whatever source derived," does not say who is to pay the tax. The taxpayer is of
course the person who owns the income, and in the case of income arising from
the ownership of property, the person who owns the property.
The vague ruling of the Commissioner, which he did not amplify or define in
any manner by his pleading in the Tax Court, is amply shown to be incorrect.
The presumption in its favor cannot lawfully be given prevalence over the
sworn testimony and the local law touching ownership.
Id. at 713, 715.
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drawn joints two antithetic points of reference: (1) if a given taxpayer
". .. may spend [amounts] . . . substantially as he chooses, and . . .
waste [them] . . . in debauchery . . .," he is the "owner" of income;l.s

but (2) if the taxpayer has merely "broad powers of control and alienation" even with only limited accountability for the exercise of such
powers, then the taxpayer is not properly the owner of the income.1 19
And a mere power to appoint or designate the beneficiary of amounts is
not a sufficient interest in the income attributable to such amounts to
1 20
constitute ownership of it.

118. United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315 (1926). X r. Justice Holmes, after
observing that the husband-taxpayer could in fact have spent the entire community income for his own debauchery if he had chosen, commented picturesquely upon the nature
of income taxes:
That he may be taxed for such a fund seems to us to need no argument. The
same and further considerations lead to the conclusion that it was intended to
tax him for the whole. For not only should he who has all the power bear
the burden, and not only is the husband the most obvious target for the shaft,
but the fund taxed while liable to be taken for his debts, is not liable to be
taken for the wife's . . . so that the remedy for her failure to pay may be
hard to find.
Id. at 327-28. See also Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930). A grantor was taxed
upon trust income where the res had been granted to the trustess who were charged with
paying the income to the donor's wife for life with remainder over to the children.
Remarked Mr. Justice Holmes for the Court:
But taxation is not so much concerned with the refinemnts of title as it is
with actual command over the property taxed-the actul benefit for which
the tax is paid. If a man directed his bank to pay over iiocome as received to
a servant or friend . . . no one would doubt that he could be taxed upon the
amount so paid. It is answered that in that case he would have a title, whereas
here he did not. From the point of view of taxation there would be no difference. Title would merely mean a right to stop the payment before it took
place. The same might have existed here, although it is not called a title but
is called a power. The acquisition by the wife of the income became complete
only when the plaintiff failed to exercise the power that he reserved. . . . Still
speaking with reference to taxation, if a man disposes of a fund in such a way
that another is allowed to enjoy the income which it is n the power of the
first to appropriate, it does not matter whether the permission is given by assent
or by failure to express dissent. The income that is sutject to a man's unfettered command that he is free to enjoy at his own opt:on may be taxed to
him as his income, whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not.
281 U.S. at 378.
119. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) (holding that the one-half of a husband's "earnings" which was owned by his wife under the non-consensual Washington
community property law was not taxable to the husband-taxpayer). The Seaborn case
by itself repudiates the Commissioner's theory that "earners" are to be taxable upon
their earnings without further inquiry. But distinguish sharply those situations in which
the "earner" once did have a right to have received in due course his earnings-then the
"earner" would be taxable under the anticipatory assignment doctrine notwithstanding
that the earnings, when received, were owned by another. Commissioner v. Harmon, 323
U.S. 44 (1944) (holding that an election by a husband and wife to be bound by the
consensual Oklahoma community property law was ineffective to relieve the husband
from liability to pay income tax upon all of his earnings including the share thereof
owned by his wife at the time of receipt).
120. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942).
The
Commissioner had attempted to subject to a state tax an unexercised general testamentary
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Conceding the general rule that income is to be taxed to its owner,
the easy case arises when the owner of capital or the one who generates
earned income also owns at the time of realization the income derived
from them. In such cases, the owner of the referent capital or the performer of the compensated services is properly to be taxed on the income, but because he owns the income, not because he also happens to
own the source of it.
The hard case is posed when a former owner of a source of income
or the generator of earned income does not own the derivative income at
the time of its realization. If the general principle that "income is to be
taxed to its owner" were inexorably true, no anticipatory assignment
principle would have arisen in the first place. The fact that it has been
abused over the years because it has been equated with the tree-fruit metaphor should not cause us to reject the principle itself. As long as a taxpayer has it within his power in due course of events to become the owner
of future income, by definition he makes an anticipatory assignment of
that income whenever he voluntarily divests himself of his right to receive it in the future without respect to whether he does or does not concurrently transfer a "source" of that income. We must stop using the
expression "anticipatory assignment of income" as a consequential summation of the results reached in a particular case; the phrase demands
neutrality. Inquiry into tax consequences should begin only after a particular case has been characterized as concerning an assignment of income-be it by gift, sale, or death. Our federal income tax system is
mature enough to reject the indignity of obscurity.
VIII.
A condition precedent to the application of a philosophic principle of
anticipatory assignment will be the one-time existence of an assignor's
right to receive income in due course of events. This teaching of the
Teschner case is properly applicable to all three areas so that, without the
existence of such a right, a gift assignor should not be chargeable with
income he never himself could have received, a sale assignor should not
be held to have received ordinary income if he himself could never have
received it in due course, and the recipient of property from a decedent
should not be chargeable with income in respect of the decedent if the
power of appointment under a statutory provision which included in an estate subject
to tax "interests of decedents" generally. The Court held that a general power of appointment was not an interest in the property subject to the power. See also, Robert P.
Crowley, 34 T.C. 333 (1960), where the Tax Court held that an individual taxpayer's control of who should perform business generated by his controlled corporation's
lending activities did not make the taxpayer taxable on the income derived from those
activities by his designees.
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decedent himself, had he lived, could never have received that income
had he chosen to do so.
Granting a former right in a particular taxpayer to have become the
owner of income in due course of events, it is the other side of the income assignment coin which will challenge judicial craftsmanship. At
what point should a court refuse to impute income to a donor who once
made a gift assignment of it? When should amovnts received attributable to a sale assignment of income not be classified as ordinary income
rather than as a gain from the sale of "property"? Should a court ever
allow a decedent's successor who realizes amounts from a sale by him of
"property" received from a decedent to use a date-of-death basis rather
than the decedent's basis in computing gain?
A gift assignment of income which effectuates "...
a continuing
exercise . . . of a power to direct the application of the income along
previously determined channels . . ." will never preclude attribution to

the donor of all future income so applied even though the donor had also
divested himself of the source of the assigned income.' 21 But should any
121. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933) (holding that the taxpayer was taxable
upon income from an irrevocable trust which he had established to pay premiums on his
life insurance policy; the taxpayer was taxable to the extent i hat the trust income was
so applied). The case is direct authority for the proposition that an assignor of even
an admitted property interest in a fund may continue to be tax-,:d upon its earnings if he
intentionally devoted the fund to a purpose he desired but was not legally obligated to
effectuate:
[One can read in the revisions of the Revenue Act] the record of the government's endeavor to keep pace with the fertility of invention whereby taxpayers
would contrive to keep the larger benefits of ownership and be relieved of the
attendant burdens ...
Through the devices thus neutralized as well as through many others, there
runs a common thread of purpose. The solidarity of the family is to make it
possible for the taxpayer to surrender title to another ard keep dominion for
himself, or if not technical dominion, at least the substancu of enjoyment ...
The controversy is one as to the boundaries of legislative power. It must be
dealt with in a large way, as questions of due process alw tys are, not narrowly
or pedantically in slavery to forms or phrases. . . . Liability does not have to
rest upon the enjoyment by the taxpayer of all the privil,!ges and benefits enjoyed by the most favored owner at a given time or place. . . . Government in
casting about for proper subjects of taxation is not confined by the traditional
classification of interests or estates. It may tax not only ownership, but any
right or privilege that is a constituent of ownership.
. . Liability may
rest upon the enjoyment by the taxpayer of privileges and benefits so substantial
and important as to make it reasonable and just to deal with him as if he
were the owner, and to tax him on that basis. A margin must be allowed for
the play of legislative judgment. To overcome this statvte the taxpayer must
show that in attributing to him the ownership of the income of the trust, or
something fairly to be dealt with as equivalent to ownership, the lawmakers have
done a fully arbitrary thing, and have found equivalence where there was none
or anything approaching it, and laid a burden unrelated to privilege or benefit....
Wells . . .did more than devote his income to the benefit of relatives. He devoted it . . .to the protection of an interest which he wished to keep alive....
In effect he said to the trustees that for the rest of his life he would dedicate
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gift assignment of income, whether accompanied by a concurrent transfer
of the source of the income or not, ever preclude attribution of all future
earnings to the transferor? If so, why? Should an "earner" ever be
discharged from liability for income taxes upon amounts attributable to
his efforts? If not, why not? Is it proper that assigned earned income
attributable to personal services of the assignor be treated in perpetity as
income of the "earner" while assigned income attributable to an incomeproducing asset which was transferred along with a right to receive its
income engenders a different result? Is it proper for the theory to seek
sustenance in continued control by the assignor over the source of the
income? If so, what of a transfer subject to a limitation or condition
subsequent? What of a transfer with a retention by the assignor of a
right to use the source of the income? Is it relevant that those who subsequently receive amounts from the source are related to the taxpayer?
Is there any correlation with the economic benefit or familial satisfaction
theories? Should we balance the respective contributions of an assignor
and assignee towards the earning of the future income, whether technically it might be derived from a "source" or not?
The statutory concept of "income in respect of a decedent" necessarily walks hand in hand with the principle of death assignments of income. Here we may start with the proposition that amounts received by
a decedent's successor will always constitute income in respect of a decedent if the source of such amounts is found in the services performed
by the decedent during his lifetime without respect to whether the decedent had an accrued right to receive those amounts at the time of his
a part of his income to the preservation of these contracts, so much did they
mean for his peace of mind and happiness. Income permanently applied by the

act of the taxpayer to the maintenance of contracts of insurance made in his
name for the support of his dependents is income used for his benefit in such
a sense and to such a degree that there is nothing arbitrary or tyrannical in
taxing it to him.
Trusts for the preservation of policies of insurance involve a continuing exercise by the settlor of a power to direct the application of the income along predetermined channels. In this they are to be distinguished from trusts where the
income of a fund, though payable to a wife or kin, may be expended by the
beneficiaries without restraint, may be given away or squandered, the founder
of the trust doing nothing to impose his will upon the use. . . . Here use
to be made of the income of the trust was subject, from first to last, to the
will of the grantor announced at the beginning. . . . He might have created
a blanket trust for the payment of all the items of his own and the family
budget, classifying the proposed expenses by adequate description. If the
transaction had taken such a form, one can hardly doubt the validity of a
legislative declaration that income so applied should be deemed to be devoted
to his use. Instead of shaping the transaction thus, he picked out of the total
budget an item or class of items, the cost of continuing his contract of insurance,
and created a source of income to preserve them against lapse.

Id. at 676-78, 680-82.
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death. But at that point, significant inquiry is just beginning. If a decedent leaves assets subject to contracts of sale which are later completed
by his successor, should not the recipient clearly be chargeable with income in respect of a decedent? Without a doubt! If a decedent's successor in interest need only enter the marketplace to receive a determinable
value for assets left him by the decedent, does not he have a right to receive income in respect of a decedent measured by the difference betveen
the decedent's basis and the fair market value of those assets at the time
of the decedent's death? If he has this right, should he not be taxed upon
income in respect of a decedent to the extent that the date of death value
exceeds the decedent's basis of the assets? Does not this mean that anyone receiving marketable assets from a decedent must utilize the decedent's basis in determining gain upon a subsequent sale of the assets? Is it
necessary to await "realization" or a "taxable event"? If no ascertainable fair market value may be attributed to "property" left by a decedent,
does this necessarily mean that a decedent's successor will receive a new
date of death basis in such property? How could this be possible, however, if we say that such assets did not have a definite fair market value
in the first place? Indeed, does this not mean that anyone who acquires
"property" from a decedent always must use the decedent's basis in computing gain upon a subsequent sale unless that property was without
value when the decedent died and its value is due entirely to the efforts
of the recipient of such property?
Do not all sales of income-producing assets necessarily constitute
sale assignments of income? Without respect to whether an incomeproducing asset is "property" or not, is not its entire value necessarily
based upon future income to be derived from its use? If that is true, are
not all amounts received upon the sale of an income-producing asset
necessarily attributable to the asset's income-producing potential? If so,
are not all such amounts paid to the seller for a right to receive future
income? Should not all sales of such assets be fragmented to determine
with precision the amount of consideration attributable to the right to
receive future income and the amount allocable to the intrinsic or salvage
value of such assets? Should we distinguish between sales of assets such
as publicly held corporate shares and interests in minerals already being
extracted by another, where the abilities of the transferee had nothing to
do with the production of future income, from transfers of business assets where the subsequent earnings will vary in direct ratio to the skill
of the buyer? If a seller of business assets retains the right to use those
assets, does he not necessarily retain sufficient control of them so that
he will be in receipt of ordinary income when he sells them even under
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the traditional concept of the retention of a source? If income-producing
assets would be valueless without the owner's right to receive income from
them, should not capital gain be eliminated entirely upon the sale of any
income-producing asset except as to amounts which the seller can prove
are not attributable to the potential income capacity of the transferred
assets? Why should not capital gain treatment hereafter be limited to
the sale of non-income-producing assets such as residential real estate and
personal automobiles? Is it not a self-evident fact that preferential capital gains have no proper place in our current business society and that
any income-compensation or otherwise-may equally suffer from massive realization in a single year! If rate symmetry is a separate problem-as it is-can we in good conscience continue a favoritism which
discriminates against earned income when no statute compels such a
result ?
Those who seek simplicity at the expense of equity and logic will
experience frustration when the concept of "source" is rejected as a basis
for decision in assignment of income cases. Particular cases will again
be decided one by one within traditional concepts of functional jurisprudence; answers to the questions presented in each case will not be easy,
but query whether it has ever been a proper purpose of law-including
and perhaps especially tax law-to provide the glib answer and the easy
assurance. The tree-fruit metaphor has too long survived its original
purpose of providing an immature tax system with an eloquent philosophy; it must not now restrain the proper evolution of a mature tax policy,
even at the expense of indeterminacy.
Indeterminacy, after all, is the sine qua non of law in the West. If
Western society prides itself on the inherent dignity of the individualas it does-it must never discount the worth of any individual claim.
The certainty demanded by the sophist cannot be allowed to dim the
eternal hope that perhaps-just perhaps-justice1 22 will prevail one way
122. One may anticipate the cry: ". . . but justice has nothing to do with law at
all." As any practical lawyer knows, however, justice has a great deal indeed to do with
law. The justice we seek here is modest, clarity of judicial expression, but it is a facet
of justice which will at least unmask and perhaps unnerve the judicial scoundrel. The
Supreme Court of Texas once considered the point:
A frequent recurrence to first principles is absolutely necessary in order to
keep precedents within the reason of the law.
Justice is the dictate of right, according to the common consent of mankind
generally, or of that portion of mankind who may be associated in one government, or who may be governed by the same principles and morals.
Law is a system of rules, conformable . . . to this standard, and devised upon
an enlarged view of the relations of persons and things, as they practically
exist. Justice is a chaotic mass of principles. Law is the same mass of principles, classified, reduced to order, and put in the shape of rules, agreed upon
by this ascertained common consent. ...
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or another in any particular case; but such a hope will persist only as long
as we compel our courts to make their ideas clear.
The vagueness in judicial decision which hides many a particular
injustice usually flows from an apparently irresistible impulse of judges
to use individual cases for the pronouncement of urversal truths as they
see them. One may sympathize with the impulse, of course, for man
always has resented the tie of his life to that particular which he thinks
enslaves him; but the inclination must be sublimated for at least two reasons of overriding importance: (1) particular cases are properly ends
in themselves, not merely means of attaining some ultimate truth, and
each case deserves the best of legal craftsmanship; (2) quality is usually
a direct function of the particular and this is true in law as elsewhere.
We have come full circle in our scrutiny of income assignments and
it is only fitting that we close as we opened by paying our respects to the
illustrious author of the tree-fruit metaphor. Mr. Justice Holmes, always
delightfully ambivalent, himself once penned the truest general proposition of them all: "General propositions do not decide concrete cases."' 2 3
They still do not and it would be impertinent either to proclaim or to demand one which would materially touch anticipatioras of income.
The act of moulding justice into a system of rules detracts from its capacity of
abstract adaptation in each particular case; and the rules of law, when applied
to each case, are most usually but an approximation to jusdce ...
Whoever undertakes to determine a case solely by his own notions of its abstract
justice, breaks down the barriers -by which rules of justice are erected into a
system, and thereby annihilates law.
A sense of justice, however, must and should have an important influence upon
every well organized mind in the adjudication of causes. Its proper province
is to superinduce an anxious desire to search out and apply, in their true spirit,
the appropriate rules of law. It cannot be lost sight of.
Ducan v. Nagette, 25 Tex. 245, 252-54 (1860).
123. Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting, in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76
(1905) ("General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision will depend
Every
on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate mjor premise ...
opinion tends to become a law.").
Holmes' opinion in Loclhwr was anticipated by the decisioai he had written earlier in
the case of Lorenzo v. Wirth, 170 Mass. 596, 600-01 (1898) :
We think the case at bar is not beyond our competence to decide. The greatest
danger in attempting to do so is that of being misled by ready-made generalizations, and of thinking only in phrases to which as lawyers the judges have become accustomed, instead of looking straight at things and regarding the facts
in all their concreteness as a jury would do. Too broadly generalized conceptions are a constant source of fallacy. Thus it is easy to 3ay that the continuity
of the sidewalk was an invitation and then to discuss in ,Lniversals the duty of
one who invites the public upon his land.

